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Interpreting by the Rules
Rebecca M. Kysar*
A promising new school of statutory interpretation has emerged that tries
to wed the work of Congress with that of the courts by tying interpretation to
congressional process. The primary challenge to this process-based interpretive
approach is the difficulty in reconstructing the legislative process. Scholars have
proposed leveraging Congress’s procedural frameworks and rules as reliable
heuristics to that end. This Article starts from that premise but will add wrinkles
to it. The complications stem from the fact that each rule is adopted for distinct
reasons and is applied differently across contexts. As investigation into these
particularities proceeds, it becomes apparent that the complications are also
rooted in something deeper—that Congress’s procedures are often hollow, even
fraudulent. Congress, it turns out, breaks its own rules with impunity.
Which brings us to a deeper riddle: What is the significance of the rules to
an interpreter when Congress routinely flouts them? If one’s goal is to accurately
depict the lawmaking process in hopes of deriving rules of construction that have
democratic roots, then surely the interpreter must discard the rules as hopelessly
unreliable guideposts. Then again, if the interpreter’s ultimate aim is to serve
democratic ends, then shouldn’t we strive toward rule of law values, ensuring
that Congress acts in an honorable way? Ultimately, I resolve the question by
first asking what the rules are meant to do. Only then can we understand what it
means to interpret by them. Through examination of many procedural contexts,
I set forth an innocuous account of congressional defiance of the rules. Rather
than a symptom of branch dysfunction, we should see the rules as guidelines that
attempt to order congressional business but that ultimately must give way to
politics. Nonetheless, some rules can help the interpreter paint a more faithful
picture of congressional procedure in spite of their not being followed. More
broadly, I conclude that interpretive presumptions deriving from the general
efficacy of legislative rules, rather than their precise enforcement, are more
successful in mirroring congressional reality.
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Introduction
In a sense, we students and scholars of statutory interpretation are all
formalists. We strive to arrive at some ordered set of principles from which
we can derive meaning from a statute. To this end, a promising new school
of statutory interpretation has emerged that tries to wed the work of Congress
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with that of the courts.1 It does so by linking rules of interpretation to
Congress. The payoff is twofold. If those who write the laws and those who
interpret them get on the same page, we can finally achieve a coordinating
system of efficient and objective rules. Better yet, the link to Congress
ensures that this particular brand of formalism has democratic legitimacy.
This new “process-based”2 school of interpretation has already
influenced federal judges, who have begun to adapt their interpretive
approaches to reflect new empirical work on the congressional process.3 This
empirical work offers a response to textualists who have long argued that
Congress is simply too irrational and too complex for judges to understand.
Armed with research, it is, in fact, possible to understand how Congress
works. All that is needed is careful study of it.
The process-based scholars have, for instance, studied modern
developments in congressional process. Legislative paths like the
reconciliation process complicate the traditional story of how a bill becomes
a law. The rushed manner in which Congress passes reconciliation bills, they
argue, should lead us to posit that Congress is not drafting with precision in
that context.4 A judge must take this into account in deciding how much

1. E.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The
CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177 (2017); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman I]; Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe
R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Bressman &
Gluck II]; Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by
the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012); Rebecca M. Kysar, Penalty Default Interpretive Canons, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 953 (2011); Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and
Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (2009) [hereinafter Kysar, Listening to
Congress].
2. See Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193,
2193 (2017) (using the term). Justice Barrett clarifies that the term “process-based approach” is
distinct from the Legal Process method promulgated by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. Id. at
2196 n.7. Whereas Legal Process invites judges to unearth the shared purposes of legislators in
enacting the law in question, the process-based approach instead “attempt[s] to calibrate
interpretation to the details of the legislative process.” Id.; see also HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
1378 (Foundation 1994) (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (instructing judges
to imagine themselves “in the position of the legislature which enacted the measure”).
3. Gluck, supra note 1, at 190–91, 196, 198 (citing opinions and writings from Chief Justice
John Roberts, Justice Elena Kagan, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson, and
Judge Robert Katzmann).
4. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 79 (2015) (exploring the Court’s
role in this regard).
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interpretive slack to give to Congress when it enacts “unorthodox”
legislation.5
Surveys of staffers have turned up inconsistencies between old canons
of construction and legislative reality. Because congressional committees are
siloed, for instance, the consistent usage canon should have no bearing in
interpreting omnibus legislation, the parts of which have originated in
different committees.6 And because staffers do not use dictionaries when
drafting statutes, an interpreter’s reliance upon them is misguided.7
These scholars have also developed canons of construction that derive
from Congress’s procedural frameworks, a strain of the literature that is the
primary focus of this Article.8 In early work, I myself argued that courts have
the unique ability to leverage congressional transparency by interpreting
legislation in accordance with legislative rules that are aimed at unearthing
hidden special interest deals.9 Later scholars have gone further to use
legislative rules more generally in the interpretive process.10
This rules-based strain holds particular promise to process-based
interpretation. If the primary challenge to this interpretive approach is the
difficulty in reconstructing congressional process, then discovering reliable
heuristics to that end may broaden the new school’s reach. The prescription
seems simple enough. If we look to ways in which Congress governs itself,
paying particular attention to its enumerated rules, we can better understand
the congressional process and hence its output.
This Article starts from that premise but will add wrinkles to it—so
many, in fact, that the interpreter may at times be left only with a sow’s ear.
The complications stem from the fact that each rule is adopted for distinct
reasons and is applied differently across contexts. It may, for example, be
prudent to assume Congress’s transparency rules are working as intended;
other rules may cause us more trouble.
As our investigation into these particularities proceeds, we will begin to
see that the complications are also rooted in something deeper—that

5. Chief Justice Roberts embraced this approach in depicting the Affordable Care Act as born
out of a process that “does not reflect the type of care and deliberation one might expect” in drafting.
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015).
6. See Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 1, at 936 (reporting that “most major statutes” are
“conglomerations of multiple committees’ separate work”).
7. Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 1, at 938 (finding that “[m]ore than 50%” of congressional
staffers surveyed said that “dictionaries are never or rarely used” when drafting).
8. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 1, at 73–74 (advancing a view that an interpreter can use
Congress’s rules to identify central sources of legislative history and text); Bressman & Gluck II,
supra note 1, at 763–65 (noting the primacy of the budget rules in lawmaking and exploring a
Congressional Budget Office canon of construction that responds to this); Gluck, supra note 1, at
182 (same).
9. Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 1, at 563.
10. E.g., Gluck, supra note 1, at 181; Nourse, supra note 1, at 73–74.
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Congress’s procedures are often hollow, even fraudulent. Congress, it turns
out, breaks its own rules with impunity.
Which brings us to a deeper riddle: What is the significance of the rules
to an interpreter when Congress routinely flouts them? If one’s goal is to
accurately depict the lawmaking process in hopes of deriving rules of
construction that have democratic roots, then surely the interpreter must
discard the rules as hopelessly unreliable guideposts.
Then again, if the interpreter’s ultimate aim is to serve democratic ends,
then shouldn’t we strive toward rule of law values, ensuring that Congress
acts in an honorable way? If so, then ignoring Congress’s deliberate violation
of its rules in the interpretive process creates a mechanism to punish Congress
when it does so. The counterfactual assumption may serve to help repair the
“broken branch.”
This interpretive conundrum defies traditional separation of powers
analysis by forcing us to confront many overlapping inquiries and feedback
loops. Ultimately, I resolve the question by first asking what the rules are
meant to do. Only then can we understand what it means to interpret by them.
Through examination of many procedural contexts, I set forth an innocuous
account of congressional defiance of the rules. Rather than a symptom of
branch dysfunction, we should see the rules as guidelines that attempt to
order congressional business but that ultimately must give way to politics.
The rules, in other words, are made to be broken.
The judiciary, of course, must generally defer to politics if separation of
powers is to mean anything. The Rulemaking Clause in the Constitution
contemplates this arrangement, which prohibits the judiciary from enforcing
legislative rules against Congress.11 So fundamental is the legislative power
over its rules that it could be argued the Clause is superfluous; that generally
accepted separation of powers principles would force us to arrive at the same
result.12
Having discarded the normative argument that the judiciary should
improve congressional process by taking seriously congressional rules, does
that mean the interpreter should abandon them altogether? To this, we must
return to the descriptive and ask if they ever bring us closer to understanding
congressional reality. The answer depends on the legislative rule and context
in question. At times the rules may bear fruit; other times they may not. Some

11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . .”); see also Rebecca M. Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the
Origination Clause, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 659, 699–703 (2014) (exploring the foundations of the
Rulemaking Clause).
12. See John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism,
Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 528 (2001)
(discussing the lack of such a clause in the Articles of Confederation and the legislative body’s
creation of legislative rules nonetheless).
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rules can help paint a more faithful picture of congressional procedure in spite
of their not being followed. Ultimately, I conclude that interpretive
presumptions deriving from the efficacy of legislative rules, rather than their
precise enforcement, are more successful in mirroring congressional reality.
A deep dive into the weeds of congressional procedure is necessary to
begin to understand what the rules can tell us. In so doing, I aim to lay the
groundwork for an interpretive endeavor that serves to refine the processbased approach by crafting a more nuanced picture of congressional reality.
Such an approach preserves the ability of judges to rely confidently on
fundamental aspects of the legislative process that are unlikely to change.
Two of the process-based school’s leading lights, Abbe Gluck and Lisa
Bressman, have noted that “[a]ny empirically grounded theory of
interpretation will face th[e] problem of keeping up with changing
circumstances.”13 This danger is not as prevalent with essential features of
the legislative process, such as the prioritization of committee reports and the
fast and loose nature of the reconciliation process, since those attributes are
unlikely to change. Congressional adherence to legislative rules, however, is
constantly evolving due to their nature as endogenous devices. Although at
any given time, the congressional process may appear to be heavily
influenced by a rule, this will change under different circumstances. The
interpreter must be attuned to this dynamic.
Others have critiqued the new interpretive school by invoking
traditional textualist arguments.14 This Article contributes to the literature by
instead assessing process-based interpretation, which is predicated on
judicial understanding of the legislative process, on its own terms. It is my
view that the process-based school creates a mechanism that sheds light on
legislative priorities. For the judiciary to ignore the realities of the
increasingly complex legislative atmosphere risks burying those priorities.
But through examination of the many twists and turns the legislative process
can take, we can see just how complex it is. Interpretation based on strict
adherence to rules or some other simplistic proxy may very well lead the
interpreter astray. Instead, the judiciary should pursue a more contextualized
approach to process-based interpretation that better reflects legislative
realities. So into the weeds we must go.
***
Part I of this Article provides background on the new process-based
school of interpretation, as well as critiques that have been lodged against it.
Part II discusses features of the legislative process, particularly those relating
to legislative rules, and the ways in which they depart from the assumptions
13. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 783.
14. Barrett, supra note 2, at 2193–94; John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1911, 1916 (2015).
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underlying some of the new school’s recommendations. Part III argues that
normative considerations mitigate against wholesale importation of
Congress’s rules into the interpretive project. Part IV offers a view of what
process-based interpretation should look like, in light of the above concerns
and observations.
I.

Background
The rise of the process-based school of interpretation has been steep
over the past decade, but it has roots in earlier scholarly work. This Part traces
that trajectory before turning to modern critiques of the school.
A.

The New Process-Based School of Interpretation
A number of scholars have attempted to improve the interpretive
endeavor by introducing insight into the legislative process. The early
scholars focused largely on how lawmakers used legislative history.
Chancellor Nicholas Zeppos recommended that judges engage in a factfinding model of statutory interpretation, examining for instance the degree
of exposure that a piece of legislative history had among lawmakers.15
Professors Daniel Rodriguez and Barry Weingast leveraged positive political
theory to identify pivotal lawmakers and the legislative history generated by
them as particularly important in the interpretive process.16
In an early example of the empirical turn in the literature, Professors
Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter conducted a case study of legislative
drafting in the Senate Judiciary Committee.17 Their findings illustrated that
drafters do not systematically comport with judicial views of statutory
interpretation.18 For instance, despite Scalia’s powerful critique of legislative
history, the committee continued to write congressional understandings of
the legislation.19 The Nourse/Schacter study also explored other issues, such
as the lack of influence of canons upon the drafting process,20 the influential
role of lobbyists in drafting the text of bills,21 and the heterogenous nature of
drafting practices.22

15. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a FactFinding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1359–60 (1990).
16. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1417, 1450 (2003).
17. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 576 (2002).
18. Id. at 578.
19. Id. at 583.
20. Id. at 600–02.
21. Id. at 610–13.
22. Id. at 583–93.
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More recently, Victoria Nourse has argued that interpretation of statutes
should hinge on congressional rules.23 Nourse reasons that legislative history
can only be understood against the backdrop of legislative rules. In her view,
the rules can be used to separate the “wheat from the chaff of legislative
history.”24 For textualists, the rules can identify which texts are central in
cases of conflict.25
Nourse argues for a presumption that Congress not only knows but also
follows its legislative rules.26 For example, Nourse argues that Public Citizen
v. U.S. Department of Justice,27 a notoriously difficult statutory interpretation
case, could have been easily resolved by following the legislative rule that
conference committees do not have authority over matters where the House
and Senate are in agreement.28 Similarly, Nourse contends that the Supreme
Court’s opinion in TVA v. Hill29 overlooked congressional rules that forbid
legislative text on appropriations.30
Most notable among scholars representing the modern process-based
school of interpretation, Professors Gluck and Bressman surveyed 137
staffers involved in legislative drafting, posing 171 questions that seek to
explore the interpretive responsibilities of courts and agencies and detailing
their findings in two articles.31 In undertaking this ambitious project, Gluck
and Bressman seek to corroborate or discredit the assumptions about drafting
that undergird the theories and practice of statutory interpretation.32 For
instance, they suggest certain items in the textualist’s arsenal are not
supported by congressional reality.
Most relevant for our purposes, in response to their survey, many staff
highlighted the importance of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) score
in drafting the statute.33 Specifically, staff revise legislation in response to
CBO’s comments on draft bills so that budget targets are met. From this,

23. Nourse, supra note 1, at 73.
24. Id. at 75.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 91–92.
27. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
28. Nourse, supra note 1, at 94 (“Conference committees cannot—repeat, cannot—change the
text of a bill where both houses have agreed to the same language.” (emphasis in original)).
29. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
30. Nourse, supra note 1, at 132.
31. Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 1, at 906.
32. Id. at 907.
33. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 763.
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Gluck and Bressman recommended a CBO canon,34 which Gluck developed
in other work.35
Finally, in a recent book, Judge Robert Katzmann forcefully argues that
judges must understand the institutional dynamics of Congress in their
interpretation of statutes. In Katzmann’s view, “understanding [the
legislative] process is essential if it is to construe statutes in a manner faithful
to legislative meaning.”36 Katzmann draws upon the work of Nourse and
Schacter, as well as Gluck and Bressman, in painting a picture of the
legislative process that may be surprising to most textualist judges. He
emphasizes the heterogeneity of drafting practices, that legislation is drafted
by staff, not members, and done so in alignment with the members’ policy
preferences, and the heavy reliance by members on committee reports.37 He
also notes the findings of others that canons are of little use to drafters, that
they do not use dictionaries, nor do they seek coherence within or across
statutes.38 Stemming out of these observations, Katzmann recommends that
judges deemphasize some canons and use legislative history to the extent the
legislators gave it priority.39
B.

Critiques of the Process-Based School
The rise of the process-based school has not gone unchallenged. Notable
critiques have come from Professor John Manning and Justice Amy Barrett,
both grounding their views in textualism. I discuss their views below.
1. Intent Skepticism
Professor Manning’s account of the process-based school is that it
simply has nothing to offer to those interpretive theories that are skeptical of
legislative intent. He posits that although Gluck and Bressman do not
explicitly align themselves with intentionalism, they rely upon the subjective
intent of the drafters in criticizing prior interpretive methods and justifying
new ones.40 Yet in Manning’s view, the authors’ findings do not undermine
34. Id. at 782.
35. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 187–89 (arguing for judges to interpret ambiguous statutes in
accordance with the CBO’s assumptions in calculating statutes’ budgetary impacts); Abbe R. Gluck,
Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1851–52 (2015) (same); Abbe Gluck, The “CBO Canon” and the Debate
Over Tax Credits on Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, BALKINIZATION (July 10,
2012, 8:55 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html
[https://perma.cc/T3RG-SLX8] (same).
36. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 8–9 (2014).
37. Id. at 11–22.
38. Id. at 43, 49, 52–53.
39. Id. at 52.
40. Manning, supra note 14, at 1935.
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the inherent indeterminacy of legislative intent nor do they obviate the need
for a normative frame of reference in making sense of such intent.41
To illustrate, Manning canvasses various approaches to statutory
interpretation and how they manifest what he labels “intent skepticism.”
Textualists, for instance, argue that social choice theory illustrates that
lawmakers may “cycle endlessly” their intransitive preferences and that
“intent” of the majority therefore depends on arbitrary factors such as the
order upon which policies were voted.42 Another of their claims is that the
legislative process is simply too complex for judges to replicate.43
But the intent skepticism is not just confined to textualists, according to
Manning. Legal realists assert that judges engage in policymaking when
deciding cases and will not attempt to unearth the intentions of hundreds of
legislators.44 Pragmatists also express doubt about discerning legislative
intent, given the number of actors involved and the limitations of the
historical record, instead prescribing pragmatic reasoning to decide statutory
cases.45 Dworkinians would posit that vexing questions over whose intention
should count and the need for aggregating intent make the whole endeavor
arbitrary.46 Finally, according to Manning, even Legal Process scholars are
intent skeptics who urge a pursuit of a reasonable purpose rather than actual
legislative intent.47 In Manning’s view, these theories leave room for
inserting normative views about the system of government into the
interpreting process, having freed the interpreter from making a factual
inquiry into congressional intent.48
Having discussed the older theories of statutory interpretation, Manning
then turns to the process-based scholars, who have in various ways proposed
methods of discovering Congress’s actual decision-making through
gathering evidence about how Congress works. Manning argues that these
new scholars align themselves with classic intentionalists but that their
findings do not obviate the arguments of the intent skeptics.49 No matter how
well we know the minds of lawmakers, Manning contends, we still must
make value judgments in making attributions to Congress.50
Manning argues that even though staff may be unaware of common
tools of statutory interpretation, this does not render them objectionable. Such
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1936–37.
Id. at 1918.
Id. at 1918–19.
Id. at 1919–20.
Id. at 1920.
Id. at 1921.
Id. at 1922.
Id. at 1924.
Id. at 1935–37.
Id. at 1937.
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“off-the-rack rules” may enable Congress to express itself, regardless of
whether the drafters intentionally have followed them.51 As Gluck and
Bressman point out, today’s Congress legislates through unorthodox
lawmaking that involves multiple committees, thus rendering consistentusage canons like the whole act rule suspect.52 And today’s staffers do not
consult dictionaries when they are drafting statutes.53 In Manning’s view,
these findings only reinforce the notion that Congress does not resolve
interpretive questions at a granular level. Instead, we must look to
conceptions of legislative supremacy or faithful agency to fill in the gaps.54
Gluck and Bressman also rely on their survey to question textualist
objections to legislative history. In Manning’s view, this is also problematic
because whether legislative history constitutes legislative intent is a
normative question.55 Why, after all, should we defer to the technical product
of unelected Legislative Counsel rather than the product upon which
Congress itself chooses to vote?56 In other words, Gluck and Bressman’s
empirical work “force[s] us to reckon with the fact that there is no way to
derive legislative intent from the brute facts of the legislative process,”57
thereby confirming intent skepticism rather than quelling it.
2. Congressional “Insiders” Versus “Outsiders”
Justice Barrett argues that the new process-based statutory interpretation
scholars incorrectly assume that statutory interpretation theorists endeavor to
reflect the actual practices of the drafters.58 Barrett contends instead that this
misses the mission of textualism entirely. Whereas the process-based
scholars are focused on “congressional insiders” or hypothetical legislators
in their approach to language, textualists emphasize the importance of
“congressional outsiders” or the ordinary readers of statutory text.59
Barrett contends that this divide can be explained by different
conceptions of faithful agency. Textualists, in her view, are agents of the
people, whereas the process-based scholars are agents of Congress.
Textualists are therefore bound to the most ordinary meaning of the statute
since that is how their principal interprets them.60

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1943.
Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 1, at 936.
Id. at 938.
Manning, supra note 14, at 1942.
Id. at 1945.
Id. at 1946.
Id. at 1952.
Barrett, supra note 2, at 2193–94.
Id. at 2194.
Id. at 2195.
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Barrett emphasizes that the process-based theorists themselves rely on
statutory text above all else and thus are influenced by textualists. And, unlike
Manning, she takes Gluck and Bressman at their word—that they are also
intent skeptics.61 It is at this point, however, that the textualists and processbased theorists diverge. If both discard actual legislative intent, the textualist
constructs objective intent based on an ordinary reader. A process-based
theorist bases objective intent on the experience of a hypothetical
lawmaker.62
Using this view of faithful agency, Barrett contends that the textualists’
predilection for dictionaries and canons is not undermined by evidence that
Congress rejects them but would only be thwarted by evidence that the
canons do not track common usage.63 Barrett extends this reasoning to
legislative history. Professor Nourse proposes that courts should interpret in
accordance with legislative rules because this is how a typical lawmaker
would have understood the language.64 A textualist, according to Barrett,
would reject this endeavor as failing to reflect how an ordinary person would
read the statute—congressional practice be damned.65
3. The Conversation Model of Interpretation
In a vein similar to Professor Barrett’s, Professor Doerfler argues that
insights from the philosophy of language necessitate viewing the law as a
conversation between lawmakers and administers of the law (courts and
agencies) or lawmakers and objects of the law (citizens).66 In contrast, a
process-based model of interpretation erroneously treats the law as being
written for lawmakers by other lawmakers. This is because it focuses on the
legislative process, of which lawmakers are acutely aware but citizens are
deeply ignorant.67 In Doerfler’s view, it is wholly irrelevant that committee
reports are more salient to staffers than floor statements since ordinary
citizens do not understand the distinction between the two.68
4. Situating the Project
On the following pages, I will complicate understandings of the
legislative process upon which some of the process-based scholars’

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 2200.
Id. at 2200–01.
Id. at 2204.
Nourse, supra note 1, at 73–75.
Barrett, supra note 2, at 2207.
Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979 (2017).
Id. at 1031, 1034.
Id. at 1034.
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recommendations are based. In doing so, I do not seek to undermine their
endeavor but rather to elevate it through refinement, on its own terms of
congressional understanding. Some of my conclusions may be taken to
further the view of the textualists and others that the legislative process is
simply too messy for judicial understanding.69 That is not my intention. I
have greater faith in a judge’s ability to accompany me in the weeds, as I will
later discuss.
II.

Congressional Rules and Reality

A.

Legislative Rules
1. Background

Before exploring the ways in which Congress deviates from its rules, it
is helpful to understand their constitutional status and Congress’s general
mode of enforcement. Each house enacts its own set of legislative rules,
primarily through its standing rules. The House adopts its standing rules at
the beginning of each Congress, largely adhering to the prior rules with some
amendments.70 The standing rules of the Senate are in force until they are
revised because the Senate has traditionally been viewed as a “continuing
body,” meaning it continues to exist after an election cycle because only one
third of its members face reelection each cycle (in contrast to the House,
where all of its members are up for reelection every two years).71
Some legislative rules are adopted outside the standing rules. For
instance, rules governing the budget process are sometimes set forth in the
budget resolution.72 Others are even codified in statutes.73 Despite the fact
that they are not formally incorporated into the standing rules, these rules are
not different in kind.
In addition to the rules, each house also collects a rich body of
precedential rulings, which have varying, and sometimes mysterious, degrees

69. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983)
(describing the complexities of the legislative process and the challenges it poses for statutory
interpretation).
70. Stanley Bach, Legislating: Floor and Conference Procedures in Congress, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM 701–02 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994).
71. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA
L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2010) (criticizing the traditional view).
72. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 3, 115th Cong. §§ 4002–03 (2017) (setting forth modifications to
existing budget rules).
73. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation
of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 346 (2003).
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of authority.74 In the Senate, for instance, the most forceful precedents are
those that the entire Senate body has weighed in on.75 Some precedents may
even take priority over the standing rules.76
The Constitution generally imposes few restraints upon the legislative
process. Article I, Section Five, Clause Two authorizes each house to
“determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”77 In addition to creating its rules,
as a constitutional matter, each house may change them without action by the
other house.78 This is almost certainly the case even when Congress enacts
internal rules through statutes. Although statutes require passage by the other
house, as well as the President’s signature to become law, the Rulemaking
Clause likely requires that they be voidable by one chamber.79
Importantly for our purposes, the hallmark of legislative rules is
flexibility. Each house can make, amend, repeal, suspend, ignore, or waive
their legislative rules.80 Each can also choose from several different
procedural frameworks in passing laws.81
This flexibility also extends towards the rules’ enforcement, which is
wholly internal to Congress. A member of Congress can only enforce a rule
violation by making a point of order.82 In the House, the Speaker and the
Chairman of the Committee rule on all points of order, which can be
overruled by the body on appeal, usually by a two-thirds vote.83 Senators who
have submitted points of order may demand a Senate vote.84 Rules can be
74. I DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, at vii (1994) (analogizing legislative rule precedents to the
common law in terms of precedential value).
75. See Stanley Bach, The Nature of Congressional Rules, 5 J.L. & POL. 725, 734 (explaining
that the “most compelling Senate precedents” are those created by the entire Senate “vot[ing] on a
question of procedure”).
76. See id. at 733 (describing precedents in both houses that “effectively supplant” standing
rules).
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
78. Bach, supra note 70, at 702.
79. Bruhl, supra note 73, at 386–90. A more controversial reading of the Clause is that it bars
rulemaking through statutes. Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional
Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 430 (2004) (contending that the unconstitutionality of statutory
internal rules is likely not “good constitutional design”).
80. Roberts, supra note 12, at 525; see also Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 1007, 1021–25 (2011) [hereinafter Kysar, Lasting Legislation] (discussing the endogeneity
of legislative rules in the budgetary context).
81. The Senate, for instance, can expedite consideration of a bill by invoking cloture. STANDING
RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-9, r. XXII, at 15 (2007). The House generally has five
procedural frameworks in which it can legislate. Michael B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of
Legislative Rules and the “Political” Political Question Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1345
(1990).
82. CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE,
RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 24 (1989) (noting that questions of congressional procedure
are decided by points of order, which may be appealed to the full chamber).
83. Bach, supra note 75, at 734, 745.
84. Id. at 740–41.
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waived or suspended in the Senate, however, by unanimous consent
agreements.85
Congressional power over the internal rules stems from not only the
Rulemaking Clause but Congress’s inherent lawmaking authority as well.
Justice Story described this inherent authority as follows:
No person can doubt the propriety of the provision authorizing each
house to determine the rules of its own proceedings. If the power did
not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of
the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and
order. The humblest assembly of men is understood to possess this
power; and it would be absurd to deprive the councils of the nation of
a like authority.86
The legislature’s control over its internal processes can be traced to the
British theory of legislative sovereignty, which was erected to counter the
monarchy.87 Perhaps because of its strong historical roots, the Framers
adopted the Rulemaking Clause without any deliberation.88
Separation of powers principles thus suggest the Clause may, in fact, be
superfluous. This conclusion receives support from the fact that the
Constitution’s predecessor, the Articles of Confederation, had no such clause
and yet the Continental Congress had purview over its legislative rules.89 To
be sure, the Constitution does place some limitations on the lawmaking
process, which the judiciary can enforce. For instance, Article I prescribes
rules for legislative assembly, selection of officers, discipline of members,
and voting and quorum rules, among others. Article I, Section Seven also
prescribes the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure” for enacting or repealing law.90
Even still, Article I, Section Seven leaves most of the process details to
Congress, apart from bicameralism and presentment.91 For instance, the
Constitution is silent as to whether an identical bill must be passed by each
85. JUDY SCHNEIDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30945, HOUSE AND SENATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE: A COMPARISON 4 (2008).
86. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 298
(reprinted 1987) (1833); see also Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 1, at 568–69 (noting that
it may be “inherent within legislative powers” to have “control over legislative rules”).
87. Stephen Raher, Judicial Review of Legislative Procedure: Determining Who Determines the
Rules of Proceedings 36 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Midwest Political
Science Association Spring Conference, 2009), http://works.bepress.com/stephen_raher/1/
download [https://perma.cc/44H5-WWCE].
88. See Bruhl, supra note 73, at 385 (noting that after an amendment by James Madison, the
section was approved “without further debate or controversy”).
89. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 528 (observing that the Continental Congress adopted
legislative rules “as a matter of course” despite the lack of authorization in the Articles of
Confederation).
90. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
91. Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 1, at 530 n.52.
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house, instead leaving Congress to designate how to agree on a bill that is
presented to the President.92 The Constitution is also silent on the manner of
passage. Under current legislative rules, a bill can pass with only one member
of the majority present, and there is no requirement that a legislator know the
contents of the bill before a vote.93
2. Examples of Rules and Deviations
The above framework illustrates that legislative rules are endogenous to
Congress and Congress may do with them what they wish. They can be
ignored, waived, amended, etc. The rest of this section will explore a few
examples of legislative rules, how they have been used in the case law, and
how Congress actually interprets, enforces, and deviates from them.
a. The Prohibition Against Lawmaking Through Appropriations.—Two
types of legislation are: authorizing legislation, which creates or modifies a
government activity or program; and appropriations, which provides funding
for the activity or program.94 Longstanding congressional rules and practice
erected this distinction.95 In the 1800s, appropriations began to be delayed
because of debates over substantive legislation. In 1837, the House addressed
this problem by adopting a rule that prohibited appropriations from being
reported on authorizing legislation if not previously authorized.96 Other
legislative rules maintain the separation between the categories, although, as
will be discussed, the distinction is increasingly blurred. Current House Rule
XXI(2) and Senate Rule XVI(4) prohibit appropriations from changing

92. Roberts, supra note 12, at 523–24.
93. Id. at 524. Although the Supreme Court has ruled there are certain contexts in which
Congress must make findings when it passes a law, there is no general rationality requirement. Id.;
see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (invalidating an
antidiscrimination law on the grounds of lack of congressional findings); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (striking down a provision allowing victims of gender-motivated violence
to sue in federal court in spite of congressional findings regarding the impact of such victims and
their families); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) (striking down congressional
regulations of guns because of Congress’s failure to make sufficient findings). For critiques of this
case law, see Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and
the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1708 (2002) and Ruth
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 (2001).
94. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44736, THE HOLMAN RULE (HOUSE RULE XXI, CLAUSE 2(B))
1 (2019).
95. Id.
96. ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES , v. IV, ch. XCV, § 3578, at 382–83 (1907).
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existing law.97 The principle embodied by these rules is sometimes invoked
by courts in the course of interpreting statues.
In an 1886 case, U.S. v. Langston,98 for instance, the Supreme Court
deployed the rule against changes to substantive law via the appropriations
process in construing whether a statute prescribing the salary of a public
officer could be modified or repealed by subsequent appropriations of a lesser
amount.99 Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly rely on an
underlying legislative rule prohibiting substantive changes via
appropriations, it may have been inspired by congressional practice.
The Court was explicit in its reliance on the rules in a well-known 1978
statutory interpretation case, TVA v. Hill, when it considered whether
subsequent appropriations measures that funded the construction of a dam
violated the Endangered Species Act.100 The Court held that the
appropriations could not be used for an otherwise unlawful purpose, in part
reasoning that congressional rules supported this result.101 The Court
specifically cited to House Rule XXI(2) and Senate Rule XVI(4) and noted
that an opposite ruling would “assume that Congress meant to repeal [a part
of the Endangered Species Act] by means of a procedure expressly prohibited
under the rules of Congress.”102 Other lower courts have adopted an
interpretive rule against changes to substantive law via the appropriations
process without explicitly relying upon the relevant legislative rules.103
97. See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 115-177, r. XXI(2)(a)(1), at 871 (2019) (“An appropriation may
not be reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in order as an amendment thereto,
for an expenditure not previously authorized by law. . . .”); id. at r. XXI(2)(c), at 872 (“An
amendment to a general appropriation bill shall not be in order if changing existing law . . . .”);
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-1, r. XVI(2), at 11 (2014) (“The Committee on
Appropriations shall not report an appropriation bill containing amendments to such bill proposing
new or general legislation . . . .”); id. at r. XVI(4), at 15 (“On a point of order made by any Senator,
no amendment . . . which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropriation
bill . . . and any such amendment or restriction to a general appropriation bill may be laid on the
table without prejudice to the bill.”); id. at r. XVI(6), at 15 (“When a point of order is made against
any restriction on the expenditure of funds appropriated in a general appropriation bill on the ground
that the restriction violates this rule, the rule shall be construed strictly and, in case of doubt, in
favor of the point of order.”).
98. 118 U.S. 389 (1886).
99. Id. at 394.
100. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156 (1978).
101. Id. at 191.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging
the “established rule” that courts must “construe[] narrowly” appropriations measures that
“arguably conflict with the underlying authorizing legislation”); Donovan v. Carolina Stalite Co.,
734 F.2d 1547, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1234
(S.D. Miss. 1983) (holding an appropriations provision allowing the EEOC to enforce the Equal
Pay Act unconstitutional because Congress had “done nothing to directly enact” substantive
legislation on the issue).
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Both the Supreme Court and lower courts, however, have decided not to
follow this rule when the amendment or repeal of the substantive law is
clear.104 One of these cases is worth discussing in detail. In Roe v. Casey,105
the Third Circuit held that the Hyde Amendment in an appropriations bill
modified a Medicaid statute requiring participating states to fund abortions
that receive federal reimbursement.106 The court noted that the House of
Representatives waived all points of order raised against the Hyde
Amendment for failure to comply with House Rule XXI(2).107 The court
rejected the lower court’s invocation of TVA v. Hill, stating that “it is not our
duty to prescribe optimal methods of legislation” but “[r]ather it is simply
our duty to interpret statutes in accordance with the intent of the
legislature.”108
Roe v. Casey is significant because the court recognized that each house
enforces its rules. The court was thus right to look at the legislative record to
see if, in fact, the houses waived the rule against legislating through
appropriations. Should courts, however, necessarily assume that Congress
has followed its rules if no waiver appears? Not necessarily.
Appropriations bills often contain authorizations through a number of
different paths, in addition to formal waiver by the body.109 Congress, for
instance, can simply choose to not enforce its rules. A member must
affirmatively raise a point of order in order to strike an authorization from
the appropriations bill because legislative rules are not self-enforcing. If the
104. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940) (noting that when Congress
desires to suspend or repeal a statute, “[t]here can be no doubt that . . . it could accomplish its
purpose by an amendment to an appropriation bill, or otherwise”); Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 836
(3rd Cir. 1980) (holding that states are not required to provide abortions that the federal government
will not fund because “the legislative history makes it evident that the Congress intended the Hyde
Amendment to have substantive impact”); Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1, 9 (10th
Cir. 1973) (“Appropriation acts are just as effective a way to legislate as are ordinary bills relating
to a particular subject. An appropriation act may be used to suspend or to modify prior Acts of
Congress.”); see also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992) (“Congress . . .
may amend substantive law in an appropriations statute, as long as it does so clearly.”); United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980) (noting that although legislative rules prohibit changing
substantive law through appropriations manners, Congress nonetheless has the ability to do so); City
of Chicago v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 423 F.3d 777, 782
(7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e cannot ignore clear expressions of Congressional intent, regardless of
whether the end product is an appropriations rider or a statute that has proceeded through the more
typical avenues of deliberation.”); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 133–34 (1st Cir. 1979)
(acknowledging Congress’s clear intent and prerogative to legislate by an appropriations bill).
105. 623 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 831.
107. Id. at 836.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of
Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 506 (1997)
(explaining that the House Committee on Rules “often does waive or suspend rules” when
addressing appropriations bills).
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members do not do so, perhaps because they support the bill’s substance or
sense enough support to override a point of order, then the offending
language remains.110 Members may also fail to object to relatively minor
provisions.111
In addition to the typical procedures available to waive legislative rules
discussed above,112 the House frequently creates a “special rule” for
appropriations bills, which effectively allows such bills to avoid points of
order under House Rule XXI.113 Congress also often enacts continuing
resolutions, rather than appropriations bills, which temporarily fund the
government. Because these resolutions are not considered general
appropriations bills, they are not subject to the rules forbidding authorization
on appropriations.114 In fact, this may partially account for the increasing use
of continuing resolutions as the means to fund the government.115
Congress sometimes slips authorizations into omnibus appropriations.
Traditionally, the appropriation bills were passed in thirteen separate
measures. Omnibus bills bundle two or more of these bills. Like continuing
resolutions, they fund a vast array of government programs and activities, but
they are subject to House Rule XXI and Senate Rule XVI since they are
considered general appropriations bills.116 That being said, Congress often
legislates in such bills, avoiding points of order since these are typically
“must pass” measures politically speaking.117
These numerous paths by which each house may circumvent the
prohibition on legislating in appropriations bills call into question whether
courts should rely on these rules in the interpretive process. One option would
be for a court, like the one in Roe v. Casey, to search the legislative record to
see if Congress has waived the rules. But even this would not be sufficient.
Since the rules are not self-enforcing, they are inherently politicized. Not
following them may simply reflect support for the underlying legislation.
Returning to arguments in favor of using the rules in interpretation,
Professor Nourse contends that courts who fail to see the influence of the
rules upon the bill’s text and structure are likely to misunderstand the
110. Mark Champoux & Dan Sullivan, Authorizations and Appropriations: A Distinction
Without a Difference? 17 (Harvard Law Sch. Fed. Budget Policy Seminar, Briefing Paper No. 15,
2006), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/auth_appro_15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L4VZMLP].
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
113. WILLIAM HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE
RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 857, 868 (2003).
114. Champoux & Sullivan, supra note 110, at 17–18.
115. Id. at 18.
116. See id. at 18–19 (explaining that omnibus acts differ from continuing resolutions “because
they are considered general appropriations bills”).
117. Id. at 19.
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legislation.118 She specifically references TVA v. Hill for support of her
view.119 As discussed above, the TVA v. Hill Court relied on legislative rules
to argue that the appropriations could not have been for a project that violated
the Act since Congress lacked the power to amend law via appropriations.120
Despite this notable occurrence of judicial invocation of legislative rules,
which would seem to support Nourse’s agenda, she takes a different approach
than the Court.
Under Nourse’s view, the relevant rules prevent an authorizing
committee from amending the bill with language contrary to the
appropriations, which means that “appropriations trump authorizations.”121
Nourse contends that Congress could not have amended the appropriations
bill to make clear its intent to override the Act since doing so would have
violated the rules. Thus, the Court’s application of the judicial canon against
“repeal by implication” was inappropriate.122 In her view, there was a repeal
by implication precisely because Congress could not have explicitly repealed
the relevant language in the Endangered Species Act even if it wanted to.123
This understanding, however, overlooks the various methods in which
Congress can circumvent its own rules.
The contradictory positions of the Court and Nourse also nicely
illustrate another problem with relying on the rules in the interpretive
endeavor. Even if we can prove Congress followed a rule precisely, it is
difficult to ascribe a single meaning to that. The TVA v. Hill Court assumed
Congress followed the rule against legislating in appropriations bills and
came to the conclusion that Congress did not repeal the relevant part of the
Endangered Species Act through the appropriation for the dam.124 Nourse
assumed the same yet concluded that Congress did effectuate the repeal. The
quandary created by the rules gets the interpreter nowhere in this instance. It
is equally plausible that Congress followed the rules by avoiding a repeal
altogether and that it followed the rules by enacting a repeal by implication.
It is also equally plausible that Congress meant to not follow the rules at all.
b. The Prohibition Against Inserting New Matter at Conference.—Turning
to another legislative rule, before a bill becomes law, the House and Senate

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Nourse, supra note 1, at 128–29.
Id. at 130.
See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.
Nourse, supra note 1, at 131.
Id. at 133.
Id.
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978).
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must pass the exact same measure with identical text.125 Legislative
differences between the two houses must thus be sorted out. One means to
do so is the conference committee whereby several representatives from each
house attempt to iron out the differences between the two positions in a
conference bill.126 Typically, this method is used for major bills.127
In theory, the rules of each house significantly restrict the scope of the
conference. In practice, conferees have developed tactics to avoid such
strictures. Senate Rule XXVIII(3) prevents conferees from “insert[ing] in
their report matter not committed to them by either House” and from
“strik[ing] from the bill matter agreed to by both Houses.”128 In other words,
the conference bill must only resolve differences between the House and
Senate bills and cannot remove language that is the same in both bills. Doing
so subjects the report to a point of order, which can be waived by three-fifths
of the Senate.129 House Rule XXII(9) has similar requirements for conference
bills. Under this rule, conferees may only consider a “germane modification
of the matter in disagreement,” which does not include “language presenting
specific additional matter not committed to the conference committee by
either House.”130 As in the Senate, nongermane matters are enforced by
points of order.131
This limitation on conferees is not as simple to interpret as it may seem.
The conferees are limited to addressing the scope of differences between the
House and Senate bills on a particular matter. The scope of differences
includes the House position, the Senate position, and somewhere in between
the two positions.132 The range of permissible options may be easy to
ascertain when the differences are quantitative.133 For instance, if the House
proposed a corporate tax rate of 20% and the Senate proposed 28%, then the
permissible scope would be 20–28%. Anything higher or lower than that
range would be nongermane.
If, on the other hand, the differences are more qualitative, then the
permissible range may be far less easy to entertain, thus making enforcement

125. ELIZABETH RYBICKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-696, RESOLVING LEGISLATIVE
DIFFERENCES IN CONGRESS: CONFERENCE COMMITTEES AND AMENDMENTS BETWEEN THE
HOUSES 1 (2019).
126. Id. at 4. The other method is to reconcile the two versions through amendments between
the houses. Id.
127. Id.
128. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XXVIII(3), at 40 (2013).
129. Id. r. XXVIII(5)–(6), at 40–41.
130. CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 115-177, r. XXII(9), at 944 (2019).
131. Id. r. XXII(10), at 948.
132. RYBICKI, supra note 125, at 15.
133. Id.
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of the rule difficult.134 An example may help illustrate the conundrum. Under
current federal income tax law, there is a top 21% rate on corporations and a
top 20% rate on most dividends received from corporations. This structure is
referred to as the “corporate double tax.” Suppose, for instance, the House
passed a bill that eliminated the double taxation on corporate income (a
reform referred to by tax experts as “corporate tax integration”135) by
excluding dividend income in the hands of shareholders but also raised the
corporate rate to 23%. The Senate bill, on the other hand, keeps the corporate
double tax rate structure as is, including the corporate rate of 21%.
Would a conference agreement proposing an increase in the corporate
rate from the current rate of 21% be considered nongermane? Perhaps, since
the House bill’s plan to integrate the corporate tax could be seen as an overall
reduction in the corporate double tax. On the other hand, just taking the
corporate tax rate in isolation, the permissible range for conferees to consider
could be 21–23%. The difference in kind between the two proposals
complicates the germaneness inquiry. Accordingly, we can expect some
slippage between the letter of the rules and how they are followed.
A primary way in which the restrictions on conferees are circumvented
is when the second chamber passes an amendment in the nature of a
substitute. Such an amendment replaces the entire text of the bill passed by
the first chamber.136 In such cases, the second chamber submits only one
amendment to conference, even though the substitute bill could encompass
many differences between the House and Senate versions. This makes it very
difficult to identify the point of disagreement and the scope of the
differences.137 In such cases, the entire text of the bill is in play and policy
differences may be acute.138 This may mean that a conference substitute
emerges that deviates from either approach. Although the rules intend to
prevent this, assessing whether matter is “new” is often impractical.139
In general, points of order are rarely made against conference reports.140
In the House, a two-thirds vote can suspend the rules, thus barring points of
order, or a simple majority in the House can approve a special rule waiving
points of order against a conference report.141 If a member senses that waiver
may be readily achieved, she may not bother making a point of order.

134. Id.
135. See, e.g., JANE C. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44638, CORPORATE TAX
INTEGRATION AND TAX REFORM 1 (2016) (referring to corporate tax integration as the “elimination
or reduction of additional taxes” arising from “corporate income[‘s being] taxed twice”).
136. RYBICKI, supra note 125, at 15.
137. Id. at 16.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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The threshold for waiver in the Senate is higher, requiring sixty votes,
but the Senate has historically interpreted the conference rule generously.
According to Riddick’s Senate Procedure, a conference report must simply
avoid new “matter entirely irrelevant to the subject matter” in the prior
bills.142 The latitude is even greater with conference substitutes, which face
“little limitation on their discretion, except as to germaneness,”143 a
requirement that has been interpreted in a “commonsense” manner.144
With all of this in mind, let us explore the risks of relying upon the
conference rule in the interpretive process, which the Court has done on at
least one occasion. In Union Electric Co. v. EPA,145 the Court addressed the
question of whether an operator of an electric company could raise the claim
that it was infeasible to comply with a state implementation plan under the
Clean Air Act.146 The Court relied on the fact that both House and Senate
bills contained language expressly providing that the states could submit
plans that were stricter than the national standards.147 The Conference
Committee had deleted this language. But rather than taking that deletion to
mean that the conferees intended to prohibit the states’ submission of stricter
plans, the Court invoked the Senate and House rules to conclude that the
deleted language was just superfluous. Since the conferees had no authority
to change the agreed upon language, the remainder of the bill must have
already reached the result of the deleted language.148 Troublingly, the Court’s
reasoning overlooked the possibility that lawmakers chose not to follow the
rules and instead decided to change course as a policy matter.
Nourse invokes Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice,149 which
addressed whether the American Bar Association (ABA) had to comply with
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which required that
governmental entities “established or utilized” by the President meet certain
procedural requirements.150 The majority concluded that the ABA did not
have to do so, arguing that if “utilize” took on its ordinary meaning of “use,”
almost everyone who met with the President would be subject to the FACA

142. FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE:
AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. NO. 101–28, at 484 (Alan S. Frumin ed., 1992).

PRECEDENTS

143. Id. at 463.
144. RYBICKI, supra note 125, at 17.
145. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
146. Id. at 249.
147. Id at 262.
148. See id. at 262–63 (reasoning that the Conference Report’s silence “offers no suggestion
that the Conference bill” intended to prohibit stricter plans).
149. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
150. Nourse, supra note 1, at 92–97; see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 443 (1989) (questioning whether FACA applies to the ABA’s advice regarding potential
nominees for federal judgeships).
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requirements, leading to absurd results.151 Instead, the majority, in a
somewhat tortured fashion, interpreted “utilized” to mean “established.”152
Nourse carefully examines legislative history to show that, in light of
congressional rules, “utilize” indeed is best read in the technical sense to
mean “established.” In Public Citizen, the Senate bill covered entities
“established or organized” by the President and the House bill used the term
“established.”153 According to Nourse, since “[c]onference committees
cannot—repeat, cannot—change the text of a bill where both houses have
agreed to the same language,” the term that was inserted at conference—
“utilize”—should be read to conform to the language in the underlying
bills.154 In this case, utilize should be read to mean “established.” Reliance
on the rules, according to Nourse, reaches the same result as the Public
Citizen majority, but in a straightforward manner that avoids the
controversial absurd-results canon.155
But is it so simple? Although both bills used the same “established”
verbiage, the bills contained other differences in their definitions of advisory
committees. The House definition of “advisory committees” applied to
entities that were:
established or organized under a statute, an Executive order, or by
other means, to advise and make recommendations to an officer or
agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government or to the
Congress, or both, but such term excludes standing or special
committees of the Congress, any local civic group whose primary
function is that of rendering a public service in relation to a Federal
program, as well as any State or local committee, council, board,
commission, or similar group established to advise or make
recommendations to State or local officials or agencies.156
The Senate definition, in contrast, created two separate subcategories of
“advisory committees,” first defining “agency advisory committees” as
entities that were:
established or organized under any statute or by the President or any
officer of the Government for the purpose of furnishing advice,
recommendations, or information to any officer or agency, or to any
such officer or agency and to the Congress, and which is not composed
wholly of officers or employees of the Government.157
151. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 452–53.
152. Id. at 462–63.
153. Id. at 459, 461.
154. Nourse, supra note 1, at 94–95.
155. Id. at 96–97.
156. Federal Advisory Committee Standards Act, H.R. 4383, 92d Cong.§ 3(2) (as introduced in
House, Feb. 17, 1971).
157. Federal Advisory Committee Act, S. 3529, 92d Cong. § 3(1) (1972).
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The Senate definition also applied to “presidential advisory
committees” that were “established or organized under any statute or by the
President for the purpose of furnishing advice, recommendations, or
information to the President or the Vice President, or to the President or the
Vice President and the Congress, and which is not composed wholly of
officers or employees of the Government.”158
There are several things to note here. For one, although the Senate and
House bills contained the same “established” language, the definitions more
generally were divergent. Under the conference rules, the houses cannot
consider new matters or matters on which they agree. Since the definitions
themselves differed, they would have been up for grabs in the conference.
This is because the relevant rules do not apply to words or phrases, but to
“matters.”159 Generally, this rule is applied on a provision-by-provision
basis.160
Furthermore, as the Public Citizen Court noted, the Senate bill was an
amendment by substitute that struck out the entire text of the House bill.161
As a substitute version, it would have conferred on the conferees “wider
latitude or wider scope for compromise in dealing with the matters in
dispute,”162 than in the case of amendments to various sections. The conferees
would have had discretion to make modifications so long as these were
germane to the underlying bills.163 Although the conference report cannot
introduce new matter, germaneness has been liberally interpreted in the case
of substitute bills.164
But even if the definition of “advisory committees” was not in dispute,
can we be confident that the legislative rules sufficiently cabined Congress
such that the enacted “utilized” language had to have been construed as the
agreed upon “established” language? Certainly not if the houses had waived
the rules, as is often the case in the House at least.165 And in the Senate,
precedents have bestowed “considerable latitude” on conferees.166 Intuiting
where precisely such latitude ends would be difficult for a court to do. To

158. Id.
159. See ELIZABETH RYBICKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22733, SENATE RULES
RESTRICTING THE CONTENT OF CONFERENCE REPORTS 1 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS22733.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYU9-UYZZ] (describing the Senate’s practice of allowing
inclusion of new matter so long as it is “reasonably related to the matter sent to conference”).
160. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XXVIII, at 40 (2013)
(allowing senators to raise points of order against “provisions” of a conference report).
161. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 461–62 (1989).
162. RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. NO. 101-28, at
463 (1992).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. RYBICKI, supra note 125, at 1.
166. Id.
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complicate matters further, even if there is no evidence of waiver, senators
and representatives may simply have chosen not to raise a scope point of
order.
One could make an argument that courts must assume that members of
Congress are “faithful agents” who follow the rules.167 Even where the rules
are evaded, for instance by inserting material at conference that was out of
scope, a member voting on the material would assume the rules are followed
and that the addition was immaterial. Thus, the general force of the rules still
stands.168
It is unclear that members would necessarily assume the rules were
being followed. Given the endogenous and politicized nature of legislative
rules, an agent may fully grasp the reality that the rules are often broken,
sometimes egregiously so, while still being “faithful” to the congressional
enterprise. In other words, faithful adherence to the congressional enterprise
does not require faithful adherence to the rules since the rules are meant to
flexibly accommodate the political desires of the members.
Thus, a lawmaker who sees that “utilize” has been added to the
conference report in Public Citizen may have simply assumed that conferees
had taken latitude with the rules rather than that its meaning had not changed.
She may have decided that a point of order was unwarranted given her
agreement with the bill’s substance. Pretending that a member assumes rule
compliance thereby erodes the self-executing nature of the rules, which
presents separation of powers concerns as discussed below.169
B.

The Budget Process
In addition to general legislative rules, the budget process prescribes
intricate procedures for the houses through both statutory and internal rules.
The basic scaffolding for the budget process is the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974, which prescribes the development of Congress’s budget plan
through the budget resolution.170 The overarching goal of the process is to
determine how much money Congress can spend each year, its spending
priorities, and how those priorities can be funded.171 The budget process has
become of increasing importance due to (1) the reconciliation process, which
circumvents the filibuster, and (2) PAYGO rules, which require deficit
neutrality of new legislation. The following Section discusses possible
167. Nourse, supra note 1, at 95 n.100.
168. Id. at 92 n.86.
169. See infra notes 262–93 and accompanying text.
170. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat.
297 (1974).
171. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO THE
FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-introduction-tothe-federal-budget-process [https://perma.cc/327L-FFF3].
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methods by which courts could look to the budget process in statutory
interpretation.
1. The Rules of Reconciliation
One challenge posed to interpreters is the increasingly nontraditional
manner in which Congress legislates. Rather than following the classic path
outlined in the Schoolhouse Rock cartoon, Congress deploys what Barbara
Sinclair has labeled “unorthodox lawmaking.”172 A notable example of this
is the reconciliation process.173 Reconciliation allows for legislation to pass
without threat of filibuster and with limited debate and amendments.
Majorities have used this powerful tool to pass major pieces of legislation,
like the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) and the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
The rushed process sometimes results in less-than-perfect legislation, to put
it charitably.
As other scholars have noted, King v. Burwell174 illustrates the Court’s
possible turn toward recognition of unorthodox lawmaking in its interpretive
presumptions.175 The Court considered the question of whether a sloppily
drafted tax provision providing for health insurance subsidies purchased
through the “Exchange[s] established by the State” included insurance
through state and federal exchanges or just the former.176 The IRS had
interpreted the Act as providing for tax subsidies not only in relation to staterun exchanges but federal ones as well. At stake was the health insurance of
some 6.4 million Americans who purchased insurance through the federal
exchanges and who received a subsidy.177
The Court ultimately construed the phrase at issue liberally to
encompass federal exchanges. In so doing, the Court recognized the
streamlined process by which the Act was enacted, reasoning that

172. BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2017).
173. See, e.g., Rebecca Kysar, Tax Law and the Eroding Budget Process, 81 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 61, 61 (2018) [hereinafter Kysar, Taxes] (describing the reconciliation process in the context
of tax reform); Rebecca Kysar, Reconciling Congress to Tax Reform, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2121, 2123 (2013) [hereinafter Kysar, Reconciling Congress] (same).
174. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
175. See, e.g., Gluck et al., supra note 35, at 1794 (positing that King reflected the new reality
that “unorthodoxies are everywhere” in the legislative process).
176. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487.
177. Lena H. Sun, 6.4 Million Americans Could Lose Obamacare Subsidies, Federal Data
Showed, WASH. POST (June 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/64million-americans-could-lose-obamacare-subsidies-federal-data-show/2015/06/02/fe0c87be-095a11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.html [https://perma.cc/CX4Q-4MLX].

KYSAR.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1142

5/15/2021 12:31 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:1115

reconciliation took away “care and deliberation that one might expect of such
significant legislation” resulting in “inartful drafting.”178
This case reflects an important willingness by the Court to adapt its
interpretive rules based on congressional process. The Court could have
easily embraced a purposive approach in interpreting the Affordable Care
Act, reasoning that limiting insurance subsidies to state-run exchanges was
perhaps within the letter of the statute but not its spirit.179 It would have done
so, however, by flouting the text of the statute. By instead grounding its
reasoning in process, the Court privileges the text, albeit through
unconventional interpretations of it.180
Courts may run into trouble, however, if they try to apply the rules of
the reconciliation process on a more granular level. After senators began
adding unrelated amendments to reconciliation bills in the 1980s, concern
arose over how the process was being abused. West Virginia Senator Robert
Byrd secured a safeguard, called the “Byrd Rule,” that prevents the Senate
from considering a reconciliation bill with certain forbidden provisions.181
Originally codified in 1985, the Byrd Rule has since been expanded and
revised.182 The Byrd Rule now allows a Senator to raise a point of order if
reconciliation legislation includes a provision that is “extraneous.” A
provision is “extraneous” if it:
(A) does not produce a change in outlays or revenues;
(B) produces an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues that
does not follow the reconciliation instructions in the budget
resolution;
(C) is not in the jurisdiction of the committee that reported the
provision;
(D) produces changes in outlays or revenues that are merely
incidental to the nonbudgetary components of the provision;
(E) increases the deficit in any fiscal year after the period specified
in the budget resolution (i.e., the “budget window”); or
(F) recommends changes to Social Security.183

178. King, 135 S. Ct at 2492 (citations omitted).
179. Barrett, supra note 2, at 2199.
180. Id.
181. ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS:
THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 1 (2009), https://budgetcounsel.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/crsthe-budget-reconciliation-process-the-senate_s-e2809cbyrd-rulee2809d-bob-keith-rl30862-july-82009.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6XR-BLF4].
182. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 20001,
100 Stat. 82, 390–91 (1986); Kysar, Reconciling Congress, supra note 173, at 2131–32.
183. See 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1) (2018) (providing these requirements).
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Like other legislative rules, the Byrd Rule is not self-executing.184 A
senator has to first challenge a provision on the grounds that it is extraneous.
The Presiding Officer of the Senate then decides whether to sustain or
overrule the point of order.185 If sustained, unless sixty senators vote to waive
the Byrd Rule or override the Presiding Officer, the offending provision must
be excised from the bill.186 Sixty senators can also overcome the Presiding
Officer’s rejection of a point of order.187
In order to determine whether or not a provision is extraneous, the
Presiding Officer consults with the Senate Budget Committee Chair or the
Senate Parliamentarian.188 The Senate Budget Committee Chair consults on
challenges under subparagraphs (B) and (E) of the Byrd Rule and the
Parliamentarian on the rest.189 The Senate Budget Committee Chair uses Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT) and CBO estimates in making decisions under
(B) and (E).190 Thus, their estimates are crucial to passing these types of Byrd
Rule challenges.
In Association of Accredited Cosmetology Schools v. Alexander,191 a
D.C. district court construed a statute that was passed through the
reconciliation process so that it complied with subsection (A) of the Byrd
Rule.192 The D.C. district court was considering the meaning of a statute that
affected the plaintiff school’s eligibility to participate in federal student aid
programs. The statute excluded institutions with a “cohort default rate” equal
or greater to a threshold percentage, which was 35% for 1991 and 1992 and
30% for any subsequent year.193 The plaintiffs argued that the threshold
percentages should be determined in the year the defaults occurred, while the
government argued that they applied to the year in which the determinations
of ineligibility were made.194
The court sided with the government, in part, because its interpretation
was “most compatible with the underlying congressional purpose.”195 The
court rejected the plaintiff’s reading of the statute because it would have

184. Ellen P. Aprill & Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye View, 81
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 105 (2018).
185. 2 U.S.C. § 644(e) (2018).
186. KEITH, supra note 181, at 4.
187. Id.
188. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 184, at 105.
189. Id. at 106.
190. Id. at 105.
191. 774 F. Supp. 655 (D.D.C. 1991).
192. Id. at 659.
193. Id. at 658.
194. Id. at 658–59.
195. Id. at 659.
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meant that the bill did not impact the budget in 1991. This would have
subjected the bill to a point of order under the Byrd Rule.196
The flaw in the district court’s reasoning is that senators often do not
raise points of order during reconciliation.197 Moreover, the
Parliamentarian’s rulings in this area are often nontransparent, inconsistent,
and often reflect a judgment call that is not easily replicated by a court.198
The ability of a judge to even discern Byrd Rule violations in the first place
is questionable.
Consider a precedent from the 107th Congress. Senate Parliamentarian
Robert Dove ruled that a measure setting aside $5 billion for natural disasters
did not comply with the Byrd Rule since there would be no impact on
revenues or outlays in the case of no natural disasters.199 The ruling was
heavily publicized because it prompted Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott to
fire Dove.200 Most of the time, however, the Parliamentarian’s rulings on the
subject are not public. Instead, the Parliamentarian rules on Byrd Rule
violations behind closed doors.201 Only when senators or staffers disclose
what transpired are we privy to how the Parliamentarian ruled and on what
grounds.202
If a court were to try to apply the Byrd Rule on its own, it would thus be
able to draw upon only a very narrow slice of the Parliamentarian’s rulings,
which can prove challenging since the Byrd Rule is not always easy to apply.
Take, for instance, the above example. Yes, it is true that, if there are no
natural disasters, the $5 billion set-aside would not have impacted revenues
or outlays. But from a risk-adjusted perspective, surely there would have
been the expectation that the set-aside would have been drawn down

196. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-881, at 61 (1990)).
197. See, e.g., George K. Yin, How the Byrd Rule Might Have Killed the 2017 Tax Bill . . . and
Why It Didn’t, A.B.A. TAX TIMES, Aug. 2018, at 16, 20, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/taxation/publications/abataxtimes_home/18aug/18aug-pp-yin-how-the-byrd-rule-mighthave-killed-the-2017-tax-bill/ [https://perma.cc/RH88-4V9U] (“If the reconciliation process is now
to be used principally to enable thin majorities in Congress to pass important legislative
priorities . . . it is not likely that a senior member of such a majority . . . will thwart that goal by
requiring strict compliance with the Byrd rule.”).
198. See Aprill & Hemel, supra note 184, at 107–08 (detailing the lack of transparency in
rulings by the Senate Parliamentarian).
199. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 148–49 (3d ed.
2007) (explaining Senate Parliamentarian Dove’s pivotal role in reconciliation disputes during the
Bush Administration); David E. Rosenbaum, Rules Keeper Is Dismissed by Senate, Official Says,
N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/08/us/rules-keeper-is-dismissed-bysenate-official-says.html [https://perma.cc/AJ8F-URV4] (noting the $5 billion disaster-relief
provision at issue).
200. Rosenbaum, supra note 199.
201. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 184, at 107.
202. Id. at 134.
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somewhat. The ruling therefore reflected the idiosyncratic judgement of
Robert Dove.
A similar issue arose in the context of the TCJA. Senator Bob Corker of
Tennessee had predicated his support for the bill on the addition of a “trigger”
mechanism that would have reversed some of the bill’s tax cuts if revenues
fell below projections at a future date.203 Reportedly, the Parliamentarian
ruled that the provision violated the Byrd rule.204 The rationale of the
Parliamentarian is unknown, but the most likely explanation is that the trigger
did not “produce a change in outlays or revenues.”205 This is again a bit odd.
The JCT listed the trigger as having a “negligible” effect on revenues,
although it is unclear whether this means there were no costs or whether JCT
was instead following CBO policy of not estimating budget costs or savings
from measures targeting overall spending and revenues.206
Taking into account the expected value of the trigger, meaning both
upside and downside risks, however, would have clearly cost the government
revenues. A reasonable person could have decided the question very
differently. Moreover, triggers have made their way into prior reconciliation
bills. Expecting a judge to make such calls on how the Byrd Rule would have
been interpreted by a Parliamentarian is problematic given the
nontransparency of such prior rulings.
Muddying the picture further, the precedence of former rulings may not
be given much weight. Even where the Parliamentarian’s rulings are
available, they often conflict. Under subparagraph (D) of the Byrd Rule, the
provisions cannot produce changes in outlays or revenues that are “merely
incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision.”207 During
consideration of the TCJA, the Parliamentarian aggressively applied this
provision to remove several provisions from the bill, including:
A provision that would have required foreign airlines to pay corporate
tax on some of their profits, producing $200 million in revenues;
A provision that would have allowed taxpayers to set up college
savings plans for children who were not yet born but in utero, costing
$100 million in revenues;

203. Ryan McCrimmon & Joe Williams, GOP Searching for New Tax Tweak After Senate
Parliamentarian Guidance, ROLL CALL (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/
tax-increase-trigger-would-violate-rules-perdue-says [https://perma.cc/4G2H-RVKM].
204. Id.
205. See 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A) (2018) (considering provisions in reconciliation bills
“extraneous” if they do “not produce a change in outlays or revenues”).
206. David Kamin, The Senate’s Revenue-Trigger Giveaway to Businesses, MEDIUM (Nov. 20,
2017),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/the-senates-revenue-trigger-giveaway-tobusinesses-97b73a624ec1 [https://perma.cc/53G7-XEPA].
207. 2 U.S.C. § 644(B)(1)(D) (2018).
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A provision that would have taken away the tax-exempt status of
professional sports leagues, producing $100 million in revenues;
A provision that spared certain private foundations from an excise tax
on for-profit companies they own, aimed at benefitting Newman’s
Own and costing less than $50 million in revenues.208
The Parliamentarian even ruled against a TCJA provision that would
have permitted charities to engage in political activities, costing $2.1 billion
in revenues.209 Contrast these provisions with earlier precedents that allowed
a vaccine price provision even though CBO could not determine its score or
an imported tobacco provision that netted only $6 million in revenues over
five years.210
One could reconcile these decisions by making the determination that
the TCJA provisions had a strong moral or policy component that
overwhelmed any revenue coming in or out and the earlier provisions did not,
but this is an inherently subjective determination that is impossible for a court
to replicate. Further complicating matters, the Parliamentarian has recently
started applying the Byrd Rule on a word-by-word and sentence-by-sentence
basis, rather than the per-provision approach that was embraced by prior
precedents and the statutory language of the Byrd Rule itself. This decision
also produces unpredictable results.211
Even within the TCJA context, however, the Parliamentarian’s rulings
are difficult to reconcile. She allowed, for instance, a provision expanding oil
drilling in Alaska that would have raised only $910 million. According to
scientists, its negative impact on wildlife most likely dwarfed the revenues
gained from the provision, and somehow it still made it into the final bill.212
Stranger still was the Parliamentarian’s decision to axe the short name of the
bill, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, allegedly because it had “no budgetary
impact.”213 This departed radically from an earlier Parliamentarian’s view,
who reasoned that the Byrd Rule “does not cover trifling matters.”214
In short, interpreting legislation to comport with the Byrd Rule has
obvious shortcomings. Many times, the Parliamentarian’s rationales are not
available, and predicting how they would have turned out is difficult given
the conflicting precedents that do exist. Additionally, the particular provision
at issue could have garnered sufficient support on its substance such that it
avoided points of order altogether, notwithstanding a technical violation. On

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Aprill & Hemel, supra note 184, at 121.
Id. at 123–24.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id.
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the other hand, the rules of reconciliation can tell the interpreter something
about the legislative process that is helpful to the interpretation. The rules
impart the information that Congress is operating with speed rather than
deliberation. They need not be followed precisely in order to convey that to
the interpreter.
2. CBO/JCT Scores
a. Black-Box Modeling.—Process-based theorists have recognized the
rising importance of the budget process in lawmaking and have called upon
courts to take this into account in the interpretive process. Professors Gluck
and Bressman have advocated for the use of a CBO canon, which directs
judges to interpret statutes so that they comport with the underlying
assumptions of the official CBO estimates of the legislation in question.215
Clint Wallace has extended this recommendation to the tax context, which
utilizes estimates from the JCT.216
Predating this scholarly work, courts have sporadically relied upon CBO
estimates in interpreting statutes. For instance, in 1982, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia held that a statute applied retroactively
because the CBO estimates assumed as much.217 In another case, the Seventh
Circuit also decided a question of retroactivity utilizing CBO estimates.218
Other courts have relied on other work product from CBO.219
Some courts have declined to rely upon CBO estimates. In a 2005 case,
the Seventh Circuit interpreted whether the term “governmental entity” in the
215. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 780; see also Gluck, supra note 1, at 182 (defining
the CBO canon by these terms).
216. Clinton G. Wallace, Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking, 71 TAX L. REV. 179, 181–
82 (2017). Residing in the legislative branch, the CBO is a federal agency created by the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 that provides budget and economic information to Congress.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, An Introduction to the Congressional Budget Office (May 2019),
https://cbo.gov/system/files/2019-05/2019-IntroToCBO.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY4S-6NUT]. The
JCT is a nonpartisan committee in Congress that has been providing expertise, including revenue
estimates, on tax-related legislation since 1926. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, Overview,
https://jct.gov/about-us/overview.html [https://perma.cc/KQ8T-33QU].
217. Nunes–Correia v. Haig, 543 F. Supp 812, 815–16 (D.D.C. 1982).
218. Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1983); see also ABKCO Music,
Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2000) (relying on CBO analysis that the bill in question
had no fiscal impact in ruling that a phonorecord was not a copy for purposes of the Copyright Act);
Gay v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that CBO estimates are “persuasive
evidence” of congressional intent); Hendricks v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 1255, 1259 (7th Cir. 1988)
(reasoning that the lack of CBO consideration to attorney fee costs indicates that the government
was not required to pay attorney fees).
219. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 374 (4th Cir. 2014) (relying on CBO report in interpreting
the ACA); Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 206 (1985) (“[W]e hesitate to tell Congress that it might
have achieved its budgetary objectives by less than the full range of changes it chose to utilize,
particularly when the information provided Congress by its own Budget Office, on which it
presumably relied, belies that conclusion.”).
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Electronic Communications Privacy Act required state, as well as federal,
governments, to pay for information they sought from phone companies.220
In so doing, they rejected a CBO opinion that the law would not impose new
costs on states, reasoning that CBO’s view “on which Congress did not vote,
and the President did not sign” could have been in error.221 That case was
later cited by a district court in Ohio, which rejected a CBO report in
construing the scope of the ACA since the “CBO does not and cannot
authoritatively interpret federal statutes.”222
The democratic concerns underlying the Seventh Circuit’s opinion
should certainly give us pause, but if the scores are salient to Congress, which
they undoubtedly are in many contexts, does this not at least somewhat
alleviate the concern? Ultimately, if democratically elected members heavily
rely upon CBO and JCT materials, then we should view those materials as
incorporated into the democratic process.
The CBO and JCT estimates are attractive for reasons similar to the rules
of reconciliation, in that they can impart general information to the interpreter
even when the budget rules that inspire them are not being precisely
followed. That is, the estimates matter even when Congress takes liberty with
the rules.
Before we get to this, however, we must first answer a practical
question. Are CBO estimates typically helpful to the interpreter? Many times,
they are not. For instance, after a rushed legislative process, Congress enacted
the TCJA, one of the largest overhauls to our tax system. The lack of
deliberation contributed to the legislation being riddled with errors. One such
example ended up being very costly to certain taxpayers. The omission of
four words from the statute meant that retailers and restaurants could not take
advantage of a provision that would have allowed them to immediately
expense renovation costs, instead requiring them to depreciate the costs even
more slowly than was granted under prior law.223
To illustrate, assume that a Dunkin’ franchise owner invests $1000 in a
new donut-making machine. Under old law, a business owner would have
gotten a deduction of $844. As intended, the new tax law would have allowed
the owner to deduct the full $1000. As written, however, the new law allows
a deduction of only $421. Since any technical corrections bill seems like an

220. Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2005).
221. Id. at 913.
222. Ohio v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 3d 621, 642 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
223. Richard Rubin, Four Words Missing in the New Tax Law Give Restaurants Heartburn,
WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-words-missing-in-the-new-taxlaw-give-restaurants-heartburn-1531215000 [https://perma.cc/A2UC-NTJQ].
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impossible feat in a sharply divided Congress, judges are left to resolve this
conundrum—labeled as the “retail glitch”—in the interim.224
What would the JCT score of the TCJA tell us about whether Dunkin’
can deduct the costs of the donut-making machine? Not much, it turns out.
This is because the relevant line item in the revenue estimate, like most such
line items, does not unpack the assumptions that the JCT made in the scoring
process. Instead, the JCT revenue estimates simply enumerate the cost of the
relevant expensing provisions as applied to all taxpayers, as can be seen in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Expensing Provision Revenue Estimate in TCJA225

From this, we can discern only that the expensing provision in question will
cost $86 billion over the ten-year budget window. There is no public
breakdown of what the provision costs on a sectorial basis, so we have no
insight as to whether JCT assumed the provision encompasses retailers and
restaurants.
In many cases then, the CBO and JCT canons do little, if any, work. If,
however, a judge wanted to try to understand JCT’s assumptions about the
retail glitch, some contextual clues could assist in arriving there. For one, the
conference report for the TCJA reflected that congressional intent was to give
Dunkin’ and similar retailers and restaurants their deduction.226 A judge
could assume that JCT relied on the conference report in scoring the bill.
Second, in scoring a later proposed (but never passed) technical corrections
bill that would have fixed the retail glitch, among other errors, JCT concluded
the bill had no revenue effect.227
This could be taken to mean that JCT originally assumed that the TCJA
allowed expensing. All of this, of course, is circumstantial and does not
illustrate with any certainty JCT’s assumptions. It also presents another

224. Jad Chamseddine, Republicans Fail to Move Retail Glitch Fix on House Floor, TAX
NOTES (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal/legislation-and-lawmaking/
republicans-fail-move-retail-glitch-fix-house-floor/2019/11/25/2b51v
[https://perma.cc/RM2L3PMH].
225. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE ‘TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT’ 1, 3 (2017), https://
www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/345B-T66Z].
226. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 365–66 (2017) (Conf. Rep.).
227. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, JCX-1-19, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE HOUSE
WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN’S DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE “TAX TECHNICAL AND
CLERICAL CORRECTIONS ACT” 17 (2019), https://www.jct.gov/publications/2019/jcx-1-19/
[https://perma.cc/Z835-PSD9].
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interpretive puzzle. Since JCT appears to follow “congressional intent,” even
when faced with contradictory text of the bill, isn’t this problematic for a
textualist?
To be sure, there are instances where the revenue scores can assist the
interpreter. Gluck and Bressman developed the CBO canon in the context of
the aforementioned King v. Burwell challenge to the Affordable Care Act
regarding when “Exchange[s] established by the State” included federal
exchanges.228 Like the JCT’s scoring of the TCJA, it is not possible to tell
from the face of CBO’s estimate its assumptions regarding how the agency
construed this language. The estimate merely showed a line item that the
subsidies amounted to $350 billion in outlays over the ten-year budget
window period.
Figure 2: Expensing Provision Revenue Estimate in ACA229

Later statements by CBO staff, however, aligned with the view that the
agency assumed the subsidies were available on both federal and state
exchanges. In a 2012 letter to House Oversight Chair Darrell Issa (R-CA),
the CBO Director confirmed that the agency did not consider the possibility
that the subsidies would only be available on state-created exchanges.230
Some courts used this letter in their interpretation of the scope of the ACA.231
In the unique context of the ACA, the CBO made transparent its
underlying assumptions. It did so in response to an official request by
Representative Issa under Congress’s oversight authority. The majority of the
time, however, the estimators do not make public their assumptions. In fact,
outside of special requests from congressional members or committees, CBO
and JCT rules prohibit staff from disclosing the inputs of their models.232 To
the extent the assumptions underlying the scores are opaque, members of

228. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
229. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir. of the Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, at tbl.2 (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www
.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/amendreconprop.pdf [https://perma
.cc/DY4T-Y8JW].
230. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir. of the Cong. Budget Office, to Rep.
Darrell E. Issa, Chairman of the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, at *1
(Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/43752lettertochairmanissa.pdf [http://perma.cc/AX56-LX4J].
231. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 426 (D.D.C. 2014); King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d
415, 431 (E.D. Va. 2014); Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2014).
232. Matt Jensen, Transparency for Congress’s Scorekeepers, NAT’L AFF. (Winter 2018),
https://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/transparency-for-congresss-scorekeepers
[https://
perma.cc/2QEW-6EHF].
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Congress will be unable to ascertain what they are, let alone an interpreting
court.
The secrecy shrouding the work of CBO and JCT is intentional. The
entities do not provide enough details for Congress or other independent
experts to replicate or second-guess their analyses, thereby insulating the
estimators from politics.233 The lack of transparency has even inspired
legislation that would require the estimators to make their models and data
available to legislators and the public.234
One could imagine that if courts began deploying the CBO and JCT
canons with frequency, congressional members, under the guise of their
oversight authority, might then pressure their staff to release their underlying
assumptions in hopes of swaying the judicial outcome. This would
undermine the ability of the estimators to fend off political pressure, with the
benefit of more openness and transparency in the revenue estimating process.
These considerations must be carefully balanced. In 2018, however, CBO
announced an initiative to increase transparency.235 These efforts may
ultimately provide more useful material to the interpretive process.
In some cases, the line items in the scores may be narrow enough to shed
light on the interpretive question. Suppose, for instance, that a taxpayer
argued that it was ambiguous whether TCJA repealed the deduction for
personal exemptions. Consulting the official revenue estimates of the
legislation, we can see that the JCT in fact scored such a repeal, and it was
anticipated to add over a trillion dollars in revenue during the budget window
period.236
Figure 3: Revenue Estimate for Repeal of Personal Exemptions in TCJA237

This would be fairly damning evidence that the JCT did not share the
taxpayer’s interpretation of the provision in question.

233. See Catherine Rampell, Academic Built Case for Mandate in Health Care Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/business/jonathan-gruber-healthcares-mr-mandate.html (“The C.B.O.’s assessment of a bill’s efficacy and costs strongly influences
political debate, but the office does not publicly reveal how it calculates those numbers.”).
234. CBO Show Your Work Act, S. 1746, 115th Cong. (2017).
235. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN UPDATE ON TRANSPARENCY AT CBO 1 (2018),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2018-08/54372-TransparencyUpdate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
7K36-VLM3].
236. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, JCX-67-17, Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference
Agreement for H.R. 1, The ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,’ at 8 (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www
.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/6R3D-HDCY].
237. Id. at 1.
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Often, however, several elements of the law are often rolled into a single
line item in the score. Also, even if the provision whose interpretation is in
question warrants its own line item in the score, the precise interpretive
question may not be binary such that the very existence of the score would
tell the interpreter anything. For instance, if the taxpayer in our example is
not arguing whether TCJA repealed the deduction but whether that repeal
applied to her particular circumstances, the score will be of little use.
b. Contextualizing the CBO/JCT Canons.—So far, the above discussion
illustrates that, although the CBO/JCT canons hold promise as reflecting
modern congressional reality, they may only help the interpreter in certain
circumstances. When information underlying the scores is available to the
interpreter, however, we must first ask a preliminary question: In what
contexts do the scores matter?
i. The Reconciliation Process.—Motivating Gluck and Bressman’s
embrace of a CBO canon is empirical evidence they gathered indicating that
congressional staff heavily relies upon the all-important score. In Gluck and
Bressman’s survey to congressional staffers, 15% of respondents identified
the Congressional Budget Office as a significant influence.238 One staffer
said, “[a]nything with a budget impact, we have to repeatedly go back to
[CBO] to understand . . . their reading of the statute and then we have to go
back and change it. This is extraordinarily widespread.”239
No doubt that the CBO and JCT scores have risen in importance in
recent decades, but the degree depends heavily on the circumstances. In the
context of the ACA, news outlets accurately reported that “the bill’s fate
hinged on the results” of CBO’s analysis.240 The reason, however, was not
some immutable characteristic of the legislative process but one particular to
reconciliation. At the time the health-care bill was being debated, the
Democrats lost their sixtieth vote needed in the Senate and thus used the
reconciliation process to enact parts of Obamacare.241
The CBO and JCT scores dramatically shape reconciliation legislation
because sections (B) and (E) of the Byrd Rule require them as inputs, as
discussed above.242 The reconciliation instructions for the TCJA, for

238. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 763.
239. Id. at 764.
240. David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Senate Democrats See Hope on Health Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/health/policy/10healthbill.html
[https://perma.cc/H8U2-TU2J]; Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 764.
241. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029. Other parts of the healthcare reform plan are enacted under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
242. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.

KYSAR.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

5/15/2021 12:31 PM

Interpreting by the Rules

1153

instance, restricted impact on deficits to $1.5 trillion over the budget window
period.243 Because its architects wished to bring the corporate tax rate down
as low as possible while also giving individual tax cuts, even this high figure
forced the creation of numerous provisions that helped offset the revenue
losses. This was so that the legislation complied with subsection (B) of the
Byrd Rule, which requires that the legislation stay within the parameters of
the reconciliation instructions. More evidence of the Byrd Rule’s impact on
the TCJA is that many of its key provisions expire at the end of 2025. This
brought the legislation’s cost down to comport with (B) and also ensured that
the legislation would not violate subsection (E) of the Byrd Rule, which
prohibits bills from increasing the deficit beyond the budget window.
From this discussion, we can conclude that reconciliation is the
appropriate context in which to deploy the CBO/JCT canons. As mentioned
above, fiscal conservatives demanded that the TCJA’s impact be capped at
$1.5 trillion, and the reconciliation instructions as adopted in the budget
resolution set forth this figure. Given the ambitious list of tax changes
Republicans wished to accomplish, it proved rather limiting. It is possible
that in a different political environment, a much greater cap would have
alleviated any fiscal constraints and diluted the impact of the JCT score. Still,
in a fiscal environment of climbing deficits, the reconciliation instructions
will most likely have high salience among congressional members.
There are tactics, however, that could arguably reduce the salience of
the score.244 In the months leading up to the TCJA’s enactment, Republicans
toyed with the idea of lengthening the budget window. A longer budget
window would heavily test the CBO and JCT because forecaster variables
across a much longer time period introduce significant uncertainty. This is
because the longer the estimating period, the more sensitive are the forecasts
to subtle changes in the assumptions underlying the scores, such as discount
rates, economic growth, and macroeconomic factors.245 Costs inside the

243. H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. §§ 2001–02 (2017) (budget resolution).
244. The Budget Act of 1974 provides a floor of five years for the length of budget windows
but does not provide a ceiling. Since the mid-1990s, the CBO has used a ten-year budget window.
Rudolph G. Penner, Dealing with Uncertain Budget Forecasts, 22 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring
2002, at 1, 12. Republicans, worried that sunsetting their complex tax reform after just ten years to
comply with subsection (E) would cause greater planning distortions, floated a twenty- or even
thirty-year budget window. Sahil Kapur, GOP Push for 20-Year Tax Cut Grows as Ryan Seeks
Permanent Fix, BLOOMBERG (June 24, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0624/gop-push-for-20-year-tax-cut-grows-as-ryan-seeks-permanent-fix
[https://perma.cc/TH4PU86P]. This tactic would accommodate a much further off sunset date, potentially overcoming the
downsides of temporary policies.
245. George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal
Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 209 (2009).
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budget window would contain a large margin of error.246 Measuring costs
outside the budget window for purposes of ensuring compliance with
subsection (E) of the Byrd Rule would become even more attenuated.
Although the scorekeepers are technically tasked by subsection (E) to look at
all periods beyond the budget window, this is an aspirational goal, and
scorekeepers cannot reliably estimate many years into the future. If the
budget window period were lengthened by decades, the subsection (E)
analysis would become relatively meaningless.
A longer budget window would also decrease the importance of the
official score along another dimension. Such a window would present
opportunities for lawmakers to pretend to pay for costly policies by enacting
tax increases or spending cuts that would not go into effect for many years,
if ever.247 It is important to note, however, that this type of problem already
exists under the current budget window. Congress has repeatedly delayed the
effective date of the Cadillac Tax, for instance, which was designed to pay
for part of the ACA through an excise tax on high-cost, employer-provided
health plans. As part of the 2010 health care legislation, the tax was originally
set to begin in 2018, although that has been delayed until 2022.248 The TCJA
also deployed phase-in taxes on multinational corporations.249 The advantage
of phasing in unpopular taxes is to meet the requirements of reconciliation
while also signaling to taxpayers that lawmakers do not intend for them to
take effect since a longer delay allows many chances for repeal or further
delay.
Lawmakers also possess another means to achieve technical compliance
with the Byrd Rule, which exploits short budget windows. This type of
budget gimmick involves pushing costs beyond the budget window and is
nicely illustrated by the tax provisions involving IRAs. Traditional and Roth
IRAs are similar savings vehicles that differ in how they are taxed.

246. The CBO has estimated the 90% confidence range of its deficit forecasts to be plus or
minus 5% of GDP after five years, but this number rises to 17% of GDP after twenty years. CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, THE UNCERTAINTY OF BUDGET PROJECTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF DATA AND
METHODS 12 (Mar. 2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/78xx/doc7837/
03-05uncertain.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVJ6-F6XD].
247. For instance, a 1997 advisory council formed to tackle the insolvency of Social Security
suggested a 1.6% increase in the payroll tax to fund the system, but only starting in 2045. SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., 1994-96 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
STATEMENTS, https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/adcouncil/report/findings.htm [https://perma
.cc/YLU5-EBGK]. A long budget window of 75 years allowed such a tax to count as an offset even
though it was unlikely to ever take effect.
248. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9001 124 Stat. 865
(2010); Suspension of Certain Health-Related Taxes, H.R. 195, 115th Cong. § 4002 (2018).
249. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 250(a)(1) (2018). The deduction for taxes on global intangible low-taxed
income is currently set at 50%. Id. For tax years beginning after 2025, the 50% deduction is reduced
to 37.5%, and thus the effective rate on such income goes up to 13.125% in those years. 26 U.S.C.
§ 250(a)(3) (2018).
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Contributions to traditional IRAs are deductible but withdrawals are taxable.
Contributions to Roth IRAs on the other hand are not deductible but
withdrawals are tax-free. Assuming constant tax rates and interest, these
vehicles produce identical revenue costs from a present value perspective.
Traditional IRAs produce revenue losses at contribution, whereas revenue
losses from Roth IRAs arrive in the year of withdrawal.
Historically, lawmakers have gamed the differing tax treatments to push
revenues to the budget window period. For instance, in 2006, Congress
passed a law that expanded the ability of taxpayers to convert traditional
IRAs to Roth IRAs. The conversion was taxable, thereby raising $6.4 billion
in revenues during the budget window.250 In present value terms, the change
in law actually cost the government $25 billion in revenues over a longer time
horizon. Because they fell outside the budget window period, however, these
costs largely escaped the budget process.
That being said, it is difficult to conclude which way the budget games
cut. On the one hand, the games potentially reduce the significance of the
score since the score is only politically salient to lawmakers to the extent it
hems in policy. On the other hand, their very existence seems to underscore
the observation that the estimates are of the utmost important to
lawmakers.251
Although each of the potential levers has the potential to take pressure
off the official score of the reconciliation bill in question, Congress’s

250. Richard Rubin & Margaret Collins, Tax Break for IRA Conversion Lured 10% of
Millionaires, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0104/tax-break-for-ira-conversion-lured-10-of-millionaires [https://perma.cc/Z4K7-K784].
251. A host of other possible tactics exist to circumvent the Byrd Rule. Sunset provisions are
one. Being able to enact a costly law, but using a sunset date to avoid violating the Byrd Rule, takes
less pressure off of the official score. Another related tactic is the gaming of budget baselines. The
official baseline is one of “current law,” meaning that it generally follows current law as written
with some exceptions. See Omnibus Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §
257(a), 104 Stat. 1388–591 (1990) (using a baseline of “current-year levels”). For instance, the
baseline assumes a sunsetted law will expire as scheduled. Recently, lawmakers, think tanks, and
the official scorekeepers have experimented with alternative baselines, typically referred to as
“current policy.” These baselines assume current policy will continue, therefore that sunsetted laws
will not expire. This is because Congress has a tendency to renew sunsetted laws as a routine matter.
Assuming they are used consistently, either baseline will ostensibly capture the full costs of the
legislation. If a current law baseline is used throughout, the law’s costs beyond the sunset date will
be captured upon renewal of the provision in question. If a current policy baseline is deployed, the
budget process assumes the law continues to be in effect regardless of the sunset date, and all costs
are captured upfront. A problem arises, however, if one toggles between the two types of baselines.
If a temporary law is first scored using a current law baseline, then the budget process assumes there
are no costs beyond the sunset date. If we then switch to a current policy baseline at the sunset date,
the costs of reenactment escape the budget process because the baseline assumes the law continues.
See David Kamin & Rebecca Kysar, Temporary Tax Laws and the Budget Baseline, 157 TAX NOTES
125, 128 (2017) (“[U]nder a current law baseline, the tax cut is assumed to expire as scheduled and
thus is scored as costing $100 billion. . . . [A] current policy baseline assumes . . . the expiring
policy is permanent, [so] the extension is scored as costing nothing.”).
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insatiable appetite for deficit spending means that, in spite of the
gamesmanship, the rules likely still have bite.
ii. CBO/JCT Estimates Outside of Reconciliation.—Are there
contexts outside of reconciliation for which the CBO and JCT scores matter?
Without reconciliation, there is, of course, no Byrd Rule. Without the Byrd
Rule, then it would seem the CBO score is not as significant. There are other
budget rules we must consider, however. These “PAYGO” rules require
offsets for revenue-decreasing legislation. If new legislation increases
spending or enacts tax cuts, the associated costs must be offset with spending
decreases or tax increases.
PAYGO rules have been a significant part of the budget process since
the 1990s. Their most recent incarnation is in the form of statutory PAYGO
rules passed through the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010.252 The Act
generally requires that the net budgetary effect of direct spending and
revenue bills not increase the deficit, judged in both a five-year and a tenyear period. The new PAYGO rules are aimed at discouraging net deficit
increases. To that aim, the statute prescribes that the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) record the budgetary effects of legislation across fiveand ten-year periods on a rolling basis. The chairpersons of the House and
Senate Budget Committees are responsible for submitting the budgetary
effects into the Congressional Record. These effects are based on estimates
by CBO. If the Budget Committees do not submit the budgetary effects, then
OMB determines them. After each congressional session, OMB finalizes the
PAYGO scorecards and determines whether PAYGO has been violated, in
which case the President orders a sequestration order.253
CBO and JCT scores thus matter greatly, even outside of reconciliation.
To be sure, when PAYGO was enacted, important exceptions were carved
out from its reach. For instance, measures relating to the extension of the
majority of the Bush tax cuts were assumed within the budget baseline,
thereby effectively making PAYGO inapplicable to such measures.254 The
Act also excludes any budgetary effects designated by Congress as for an
“emergency.”255 Finally, Congress can expressly exclude legislation from the
PAYGO scorecards when enacting subsequent legislation.
Through these various means, Congress has excluded the budgetary
effects of approximately thirty measures from PAYGO from the period

252.
253.
254.
255.

Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 2, 124 Stat. 4 (2010).
Id. § 5.
Id. § 7.
Id. § 4(g).
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between 2010 and 2016.256 Some of these measures increased the deficit by
trillions of dollars. In 2017, the $1.5 trillion TCJA was shielded from
PAYGO through a piece of legislation passed subsequently to TCJA.257 In
2018 alone, Congress excluded the PAYGO effects from the scorecards of
three bills.258 In 2018, Congress also zeroed out the PAYGO balance
altogether as of the date of enactment in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.259
To summarize, outside of reconciliation, the score certainly matters
unless PAYGO has been waived. If an interpreter wishes to use the scores
and underlying assumptions in the interpretive process, then the weight given
to them should vary depending on whether such waivers are in effect.
c. Coda on the Filibuster.—In the spring of 2017, Senate Republicans
deployed the so-called “nuclear option,” removing the filibuster obstacle to
the confirmation of nominees to the Supreme Court.260 Given the radical shift
away from the protection of minority rights, one wonders how long the
legislative filibuster can hold on. If anything, reconciliation functions as a
“release valve,” allowing a simple majority to determine major policy
outcomes and thereby preserving the legislative filibuster for perhaps longer
than it otherwise would last.261 Eventually, however, increasing gridlock and
partisanship may make the legislative filibuster a relic of a bygone era of
minority rights in the Senate. If this occurs, the role of the budget process
will greatly diminish. In a world without the filibuster, the Byrd Rule and
PAYGO would have no teeth since they are enforced only by the threat of
minority protections. Any interpretation based on budget rules may thus have
to be discarded if the filibuster falls.

256. BILL HENIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMORANDUM: BUDGETARY EFFECTS
EXCLUDED FROM THE STATUTORY PAY-AS-YOU-GO (STAT-PAYGO) SCORECARDS, 4–5 tbl.1
(2017).
257. Further Additional Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R.J. Res. 28, 116th Cong. § 104
(2019).
258. See VA MISSION Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-182, § 512, 132 Stat. 1393, 1481 (2018);
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 1701, 132 Stat. 3186, 3532 (2018);
SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 8231, 132 Stat. 3894, 4143
(2018); see also David Ditch, PAYGO: A Bipartisan Failure in Need of Replacement, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/paygo-bipartisanfailure-need-replacement [https://perma.cc/29Y5-6KWU] (identifying the exclusions in the 2018
bills as a technique used to skirt the consequences of PAYGO).
259. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 30102, 132 Stat. 64, 123; see also
Ditch, supra note 258 (calling the zeroed-out scorecard the “most abusive” technique to avoid
PAYGO responsibility).
260. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for
Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neilgorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html [https://perma.cc/J32M-87RH].
261. Kysar, Taxes, supra note 173, at 63.
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Summary

We can make a few general observations from our canvassing of general
legislative and budget process rules. The most rudimentary insight is that
legislative rules are not followed with precision and instead flexibly
accommodate political preferences. It is surprisingly difficult to tell when the
rules are being followed. The rules are not self-enforcing; a member of
Congress must affirmatively make a point of order against a rule violation.
But the absence of points of order against the bill may simply reflect political
support of its substance rather than compliance with the rules.
From this, we can conclude that, as a descriptive matter, construing a
statute in a way that follows the rules may be an inaccurate depiction of
congressional reality. I will flesh out more of what the interpreter can take
from the rules below in Part IV, but we can glean some important insights
from the discussion of budget rules.
In the context of interpreting in accordance with the rules of
reconciliation, we also encounter rules that are not followed. The picture is
complicated further by the opacity of the Parliamentarian’s rulings in this
area. Nonetheless, the discussion does show how the stratospheric rise in
reconciliation’s importance may have some interpretive payoffs. Congress is
legislating through this harried and truncated process in order to accomplish
any policymaking at all in a highly partisan era. Perhaps, then, courts should
be somewhat forgiving in their interpretation of its slipshod work product.
The CBO and JCT canons show particular promise, with some caveats.
They derive somewhat from an assumption that Congress is following its
rules; the estimates would be much less important to lawmakers if the rules
of reconciliation or PAYGO were immaterial. But we need not assume
perfect compliance with those rules in order to see their power. This is
because the general architecture of the budget process and the pressures on
Congress to deliver legislative benefits through tax and spending guarantee
that the estimates remain a focal point in the legislative process.
Of course, there are caveats here too. Congress has several mechanisms
through which it can significantly reduce the salience of the scores. If those
mechanisms are present, then courts should take this into account in deciding
how much weight to give to the scores. The biggest limitation for the CBO
and JCT canons stems from the fact that the nontransparency of the
estimators’ assumptions will present a challenge to an interpreter who wishes
to use them.
III. Normative Considerations
Leaving aside qualms as to whether the rules accurately capture
congressional behavior, one could still argue that leveraging the rules in the
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interpretive process allows the judiciary to indirectly enforce them.262
Perhaps, then, this is beneficial. Although this indirect enforcement is
presumably constitutionally permissible whereas direct enforcement is
generally not, it still presents normative considerations. This Part III explores
such arguments.
A.

Undermining the Political Will of Congress
First and foremost, nonenforcement of the rules may reflect strong
political support for the bill on its substance. If the body overruled a chair’s
ruling on a point of order, this may also reflect substantive support on the
legislation’s merits rather than support for the procedural ruling.263 This may
also be the case if no point of order is made. In this manner, the rules are
inherently politicized.264 To assume they are being followed undermines the
core of the lawmaking function—to formulate and implement policy
judgments. Nourse contends that courts must assume lawmakers are faithful
agents and therefore that they follow their own rules.265 In other words, only
bad actors would flout the rules. But this is not the case. Congress itself
intends the rules to accommodate political preferences rather than being
ironclad. A good actor can thus violate the rules because the rules
contemplate such violations.
One could reason that encouraging Congress to follow its rules,
however, improves the legislative process. Embracing rule-based
interpretation thus harkens back to Hans Linde’s “due process of lawmaking”
theory.266 Linde criticized rationality review of legislation for its
inconsistency with congressional reality, since laws are the product of policy
choices and compromises, appeasement of certain interests, and equitable
considerations, rather than being tailored to a precise goal.267
Linde instead proposed that the legislation be evaluated based on
whether Congress observed due process of lawmaking, attempting to avoid
the countermajoritarian difficulty. This due process of lawmaking means that
“[the] government is not to take life, liberty, or property under color of laws
that were not made according to a legitimate law-making process.”268
Although Linde did not flesh out which procedures were forbidden and which

262. Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 1, at 521 (arguing this in the context of earmark
disclosure rules); see also WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1075 (5th ed. 2009) (describing circumstances in which
courts might be able to enforce congressional rules indirectly through statutory interpretation).
263. POPKIN, supra note 262, at 1075.
264. Id.
265. Nourse, supra note 1, at 95 n.100.
266. Hans Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
267. Id. at 207–08.
268. Id. at 239.
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were mandated, he summarized that the “[d]ue process of lawmaking will
include some but not all of the rules governing the particular lawmaking
body.”269 Linde acknowledged that judges may be reluctant to strike down
legislation based on process concerns.270 He nonetheless encouraged them to
do so while also reiterating the value of fostering good process, regardless of
the availability of judicial review.271
Professors Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey identified three different
iterations of process-oriented judicial review.272 One concerns whether the
legislature is the right policymaking institution for the given question.
Another focuses on whether the legislature followed rules of procedure. And
a third, reflected in the federalism cases, focuses on whether Congress
sufficiently deliberated a statute.273 Collectively, these strands encourage the
legislature to compile findings, identify applicable legal standards, and enact
law through legitimate procedures and deliberation.274
Generally, courts have been reluctant to embrace due process of
lawmaking, with a few exceptions.275 The most notable are the federalism
cases, in which the Court required Congress to make certain findings before
legislating in an area traditionally reserved to the states.276 Another example
is Powell v. McCormack,277 in which the Court held that Congress could not
expel a member when it did not follow certain procedures.278 In INS v.
Chadha,279 the Court invalidated the legislative veto as in conflict with
Article I, Section Seven.280 The Court struck down the line item veto for
similar reasons in Clinton v. City of New York.281
The judiciary, however, generally shies away from intruding too deeply
into the legislative process. The Court has interpreted the Rulemaking Clause

269. Id. at 245.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 118–31 (1991).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1710.
275. The Court has, for instance, held that the Due Process Clause does not apply to legislatures.
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S 598, 612 (2000) (suggesting that when
Congress legislates on matters traditionally reserved to the states, the Court may expect Congress
to make particular findings about that legislation’s effects on interstate commerce); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–31, 536 (1997) (same); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562–63
(1995) (suggesting the same with respect to congressional overreach under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
277. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
278. Id. at 550.
279. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
280. Id. at 958.
281. 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998).
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broadly, holding that the Clause preempts judicial review of the rules.282
Other courts have continued this expansive view of the Clause, generally
deferring to Congress except to the extent congressional procedure faces
constitutional limitations283 or infringes upon fundamental rights of
individuals (as when Congress is sitting in a semijudicial role).284 A stark
example of this is Field v. Clark,285 in which the Court held that it could not
second-guess the congressional practice that presumes the bill presented to
the President is the one agreed to by Congress, even if the bills in question
differed. The Field Court reasoned that Congress, and Congress alone, had
the power to determine the details of the lawmaking process.286
Professors Frickey and Steven Smith recognized that at least some
strands of the deliberative model of Congress are in conflict with its decisionmaking reality.287 Although their comments were aimed specifically at the
third strand of due process of lawmaking, regarding whether Congress
sufficiently deliberated, they are equally relevant to the theory as a whole.
This is because the normative argument for holding Congress to its rules is
presumably aimed at improving the deliberative process.
Frickey and Smith draw upon the work of James Q. Wilson, who noted
that the imposition of rational policymaking is in tension with democratic
ideals. Specifically, that imposing rational policymaking on lawmakers
reduces their ability to bargain, to engage interest groups, and to represent
their constituents.288 Where the Court assumes a deliberative legislature is
where it falters, according to Frickey and Smith. The Senate, House, and
President must all vote on policies when, much of the time, the process
involves developing majority coalitions through competitive, antideliberative
tactics.289 The Constitution does not require that this process reflect reasoned
deliberation. Going beyond the enforcement of explicit constitutional
constraints on lawmaking, like the Origination Clause or the legislative veto,

282. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
283. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 80, at 1022–23.
284. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 117–19 (1963) (reversing a petitioner’s conviction
because a congressional committee did not follow its own rules in considering the petitioner’s
request for a closed session); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 88–89 (1949) (holding that
a witness could not be convicted of perjury because the House Committee to which he gave
testimony lacked a quorum according to the legislative rules); United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6,
33 (1932) (interpreting Senate rules to bar the reconsideration of a nominee to the Federal Power
Commission).
285. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
286. Id. at 671; see also John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary
Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1790 n.63 (2003)
(describing the enrolled bill doctrine “as an analytical corollary to the Rulemaking Clause”).
287. Frickey & Smith, supra note 93, at 1709.
288. Id. at 1742.
289. Id. at 1744.
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also squarely puts the judiciary in conflict with separation of powers
values.290
Professor Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov has argued in favor of judicial review of
the legislative process. Bar-Siman-Tov invokes H.L.A. Hart’s assertion that
a given legal system must have mechanisms to determine the legal rules, or
“rules of recognition.” According to Bar-Siman-Tov, because the judiciary
can only apply those laws that meet the rules of recognition, the judiciary
must have the means to determine their content, i.e., whether laws were
validly enacted.291
This argument assumes its conclusion, however, in that equally
plausible is the possibility that the judiciary defers to Congress in
determining whether laws are validly enacted before conducting its
substantive review. Indeed, this is the American tradition since the Founding,
which is contemplated by the Rulemaking Clause in the Constitution.292 In
other words, judicial review derives ultimately from the people, and the
people have chosen to reserve process to Congress. As discussed above, this
has roots in separation of powers concerns that trace back to England. These
concerns recognize that process cannot be separated from politics and
policymaking. Without the ability to enforce, shape, and waive the rules
governing lawmaking, Congress cannot effectuate its inherently political role
as policymaker. Process is important for institutional legitimacy, but, as a
constitutional and normative matter, it must ultimately give way to politics.
One possible area that deserves special consideration are rules aimed at
transparency in the lawmaking process. In prior work, I have previously
argued for the judiciary to assume legislative rules are functioning correctly
in the context of earmark disclosure rules, which attempt to disclose special
interest spending and tax legislation.293 By refusing to recognize undisclosed
special interest deals, I argued, Congress would be incentivized to follow the
disclosure rules.
The reason why this context is distinct from a separation of powers
perspective is that even where Congress collectively wishes to follow the
earmark rules, it cannot enforce them upon its members. After all, the goal
of the rules is to unearth hidden special interest deals. It may, then, be
appropriate for the judiciary to assist Congress in following its rules when

290. Id. at 1750.
291. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative
Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1946 (2011).
292. See POPKIN, supra note 262, at 1074 (“There is no doubt that Congress can disregard its
own procedural rules concerning how it adopts, statutes, assuming these rules are not
constitutionally required. This is true even if the rules are contained in a prior statute, rather than in
a House or Senate resolution.”).
293. Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 1.
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the rules are aimed at transparency. Otherwise, there is no mechanism to
identify rule violations within Congress.
B.

The Practical Need for Rule Flexibility
Giving Congress the leeway to apply its rules flexibly also allows it to
navigate between two competing goals in the legislative process: deliberation
and efficiency. The rules themselves oscillate between these two poles.
Giving Congress the liberty to relax the rules, at times, allows it to balance
the two needs given the circumstances.
Although thus far our discussion of enforcing the rules upon Congress
suggests this would further deliberation, not all the rules further that end.
Consider the most famous legislative rule of all—the rule that allows a
supermajority in the Senate to invoke cloture, thereby cutting off the Senate
tradition of unlimited debate.294 The minority right to filibuster has been
further eroded by other developments, such as the elimination of the filibuster
with respect to lower court and Supreme Court nominees.295
Reconciliation and other fast-track processes, by definition, limit
deliberation. Some of the legislative rules governing conference committees
could also be characterized as curtailing deliberation. Once a bill comes out
of conference, for instance, amendments cannot be made on the floor.296
Debate on conference bills is often limited, even in the Senate.297
Notably absent from the legislative rules are those long embraced by
state legislatures to improve deliberation. For instance, many state
constitutions require that all legislation be confined to a single subject.298
Tracing back to ancient Rome,299 the purpose of this rule is to prevent
logrolling, which allows otherwise unpopular provisions to be consolidated
into one package in hopes of garnering a majority vote.300 The single-subject
rule helps ensure that each provision gets full attention from legislators and
citizens so that they are carefully considered.301 Other requirements missing
from the rules that would improve deliberation are rules requiring all bills to
be read or barring the introduction of legislation at certain points in time.302

294. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XXII (2013).
295. See Kysar, Taxes, supra note 173, at 68 (describing the elimination of the filibuster for
court appointments as part of an incremental erosion of the filibuster’s power).
296. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XVII, at 12 (2013).
297. Id.
298. Michael D. Gilbert, Legislative Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 803, 805 (2006).
299. Id. at 811.
300. Id. at 813–14.
301. Id. at 816.
302. Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
361, 365 (2004).

KYSAR.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1164

5/15/2021 12:31 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:1115

On the other hand, some of the rules are aimed at preserving the
deliberative character of the legislature. The rules confining conferees to
previously agreed upon matters could be said to function like a single-subject
rule, allowing conferees ample opportunity to consider each provision. The
rules forbidding legislating on appropriations are similar. By closing the
universe of possible provisions, Congress can more fully deliberate on the
ones that remain.
The rules thus represent the reality that deliberation cannot be pursued
at all costs. An overly robust deliberative process could damage the
democracy since Congress would not be able to legislate effectively. The
legislative rules, as written, attempt to navigate between these two goals.
Ultimately, however, achieving the balance between deliberation and
legislative efficiency is highly contextual. The ability of Congress to adapt
the rules to accommodate political will allows it to navigate between debate
and action in a given circumstance. Holding Congress to the rules, either
directly through judicial enforcement or indirectly through statutory
interpretation, would hinder this process.
Still, perhaps the interpretive process could fulfill other goals of the
rules by incorporating them. For instance, one aim of the budget process is
to assist Congress in making coordinated decisions in an attempt to reign in
deficits.303 One might posit, then, that indirect enforcement of the budget
rules could help further fiscal discipline.
In particular, the aim of the Byrd Rule is to protect Congress from its
worst impulses by closing off the reconciliation process to deficit-increasing
legislation. In practice, however, the Byrd Rule has failed to achieve its goal.
As I have discussed in prior work, Congress can enact costly tax cuts
through reconciliation by simply sunsetting them so that there are no deficit
effects beyond the budget window. Because the tax cuts become politically
entrenched once the public gets used to them, lawmakers tend to extend them
without paying for them in the budget process.304 The existence of the sunset
provision may allow lawmakers to hide behind the guise of fiscal
responsibility when in actuality the sunsets are undoing fiscal discipline. The
Byrd Rule sets up this dynamic.

303. This aim may be responsive to public-choice theorists who posit that deficit spending
occurs because politicians are inevitably pulled toward spending and away from taxing in order to
appease their constituents. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN
DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES (1977), in 8 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES M. BUCHANAN 144 (2000) (noting that “[t]he possibility of borrowing” allows politicians to
“expand rates of spending without changing current levels of taxation” and that the resulting
increase in future taxation “will not generate constituency pressures” comparable to an increase in
present taxes).
304. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 80, at 1034–35.
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Further, although the Byrd Rule sets a ceiling such that the
reconciliation bill cannot add more to the deficit than as prescribed in the
budget resolution, this has effectively functioned as a ceiling and a floor, with
Congress increasing the deficit in the amount of the cap.305 For instance, the
FY 2018 budget resolution allowed Congress to add $1.5 trillion to the
deficit, and the TCJA as enacted added over $1.4 trillion to the deficit.306
The Byrd Rule may also, ironically, block fiscally responsible
provisions. The trigger mechanism that Senator Corker proposed in the TCJA
to reverse some of the tax cuts if certain revenue goals were not met did not
make it into the bill because it violated the Byrd Rule, presumably because it
would not change outlays or revenues.307 A more infamous case occurred in
1997, when Senator Bill Frist (R-TN) proposed an amendment that would
have required a sixty-vote threshold for legislation that increased the deficit
and would have mandated the President’s submission of a balanced budget
to Congress. A Byrd Rule point of order, which was one vote shy of being
waived, struck the provision.308 This in turn paved the way for the costly Bush
tax cuts.309
More fundamentally, there is a danger in giving too much primacy to
the budget process.310 The budget process, problematically, does not take into
account nonfederal savings.311 Savings from preventing illnesses of the
public do not factor into the cost of, say, providing a vaccine—only
preventing illnesses in those who receive federal assistance in the form of
Medicare and Medicaid count for budget purposes.312 Such conventions are
there to ensure the budget is depicted accurately. There is tremendous danger,
however, in relying on the scores too heavily in the legislative process since
there are, of course, societal benefits to off-budget items.
Policymaking is further distorted when budget considerations supplant
other policy objectives. Scholars have voiced these concerns in the tax
context, observing that tax legislation is increasingly shaped by budget

305. Id.
306. H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. §§ 2001–02 (2017) (budget resolution); JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 8 (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.jct
.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/8H7P-4GSS].
307. McCrimmon & Williams, supra note 203.
308. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 184, at 113.
309. Id. at 114.
310. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 765.
311. Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J.
1555, 1592–93 (2006).
312. Id. at 1592.
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pressures.313 We are left with a tax code riddled with sunsets and provisions
that are simply there to take advantage of timing games, like the
aforementioned Roth IRA.
Strict adherence to budget rules may also be entirely inappropriate in
certain economic contexts. For instance, during the late 2000s, a reluctance
to deficit-spend muted government responses to the financial crisis, likely
prolonging the downturn. The ability to relax the budget rules to deliver
stimulus is essential to the proper functioning of the economy.
Finally, the budget process gives a tremendous amount of power to
unelected staff of the estimating entities. Reinforcing this power through
statutory interpretation arguably moves the lawmaking process further from
democratic accountability.314
C.

Summary

To summarize, democracy demands nimbleness of legislative rules.
Inherently politicized, the rules cannot be deployed with rigidity without
threatening the lawmaking endeavor. Within Congress, procedure on the
ground reflects this maxim. Judicial interpretation should as well.
Practical concerns also dictate a relaxed approach to the rules. Strict
enforcement of them prevents Congress from weighing deliberative goals
against efficiency, and budgetary aims against other policies. Still, the rules
may impart some valuable information to the interpreter, a topic to which I
now turn in Part IV.
IV. Taking Procedure Seriously
If a strictly applied rule-based approach to interpretation is problematic,
then how should a process-based interpreter think about congressional
procedure?
One possible interpretive approach that follows from these insights is to
distinguish those unwavering features of the legislative process from more
ephemeral ones. Others’ contributions in this area are useful, ranging from
how legislative history works in particular areas of law315 to how certain types

313. Professor Michael Graetz concludes that budget pressures restrict lawmakers to “mak[e]
the revenue numbers ‘come out right,’” crowding out traditional tax policy criteria, like simplicity,
efficiency, and fairness. Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609,
673 (1995).
314. Gluck and Bressman recognize this danger but argue that it reflects a view that legal
doctrine should “improve upon, not merely reflect, the legislative process,” a goal about which
courts need to be explicit. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 783.
315. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory
Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1231, 1235 (2009) (comparing the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history in its tax law and
workplace law jurisprudence).
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of legislation operate.316 Grounding an interpretive approach in fundamental
features of the legislative process safely guards against unintentionally
straying from reality.
On the other hand, the insights of this Article could instead support a
highly granular approach to process-based interpretation. If the context
allows, an interpreter could dive deep into the process to see how it has borne
out in the particular circumstances. As to which road the interpreter should
take at this fork, of course, depends on the context. If an interpreter is assured
in her ability to understand the ins and outs of the process, then a detailed
approach may be justified. If instead the interpreter can glean only
generalities with confidence, then an approach incorporating more high
levels of abstraction is warranted.
Importantly, congressional procedure can guide the interpreter in both
of these endeavors, so long as it is contextualized. The architecture and thrust
of the legislative rules, in turn, can often assist a court in developing a more
nuanced understanding of congressional procedure. The remainder of this
Part IV explores examples to illustrate. My general aim is to begin to lay the
groundwork for refinements of the process-based school. My audience is
those who take an interpretive view rooted in the judiciary as a faithful agent
of the legislature. Thus far, I have detailed ways in which a process-based
interpretation woodenly premised on proper functioning of the rules can
undermine the interpreter’s role as faithful agent. I now explore ways in
which taking procedure seriously, in all its pliancy, has the potential to
strengthen this relationship.
A.

Reconciliation
Revisiting King v. Burwell can help illustrate the promise of using
procedure in interpretation. Recall the issue was whether subsidies for health
insurance purchased on “an Exchange established by the State” also included
federal exchanges.317 The King Court reasoned that Congress used
reconciliation to pass the ACA, which provided limited opportunities for
debate and amendment. “[A]s a result, the Act does not reflect the type of
care and deliberation that one might expect of such significant legislation.”318
The Court then concluded that the statute was ambiguous, making this
conclusion after considering “that the words of a statute must be read in their
context.”319

316. See Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 763–64 (discussing the impact of the CBO’s
budget score on proposed legislation).
317. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015).
318. Id. at 2492.
319. Id.

KYSAR.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1168

5/15/2021 12:31 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:1115

If the ACA had been enacted in the course of the regular legislative
process, the King Court may have been less forgiving of the legislature in
finding the statute unambiguous. Although this approach could shape the
legislative process by forcing Congress to draft more accurately, it would
impede Congress’s ability to privilege action over deliberation.
Importantly, the King Court focused on reconciliation but did so in
broad strokes. Identifying reconciliation as having a tendency to produce
imperfect drafting is by no means an arcane feature of reconciliation. Rather,
it flows from reconciliation’s fundamental feature—it’s a fast-track process
intended to expedite legislation rather than nurture debate. In so doing, the
King Court privileged legislative rules in its interpretation—specifically the
rules that limit debate in this fashion—but examined their general thrust
rather than their precise application.
If instead the Court had focused on the minutiae of reconciliation, it
might have run into trouble. Suppose, for instance, that giving tax credits for
insurance bought on state exchanges did not have an impact on revenue
because, in our hypothetical world, the states also were required to reimburse
the federal government for the tax credits. A court could reason that the term
“Exchange” must in fact cover those set up by the federal government,
otherwise the relevant provision would have violated the Byrd Rule for not
impacting revenues.
Would this have been a fair application of the Byrd Rule? For one, it
overlooks the possibility that members may not have objected to a Byrd Rule
violation because they agreed with the provision’s policy. Even those
members opposed to the provision may have been unwilling to object if they
thought a supermajority would have easily overcome a point of order.
Furthermore, it may also not be easy to ascertain whether in fact the
provision had impacted revenues. Suppose for instance that a few states were
insolvent and therefore unable to reimburse the federal government for tax
credits. In that case, interpreting exchanges to only encompass states would
have lost revenues, thereby meeting the Byrd Rule requirements even without
the federal exchanges. Because the Parliamentarian rulings in this area are
opaque, a court may lack relevant information in this regard.
Another approach, and one taken by the lower courts, was to focus on
the CBO estimate. As mentioned above, a congressional committee
subpoenaed CBO to release its underlying assumptions, which indicated the
subsidies were aimed at insurance purchased on both state and federal
exchanges.
With some caveats, the CBO score does not present the same concerns
that a granular-level reading of the Byrd Rule does. A court’s reliance on the
CBO score is premised on the efficacy of legislative rules but not their precise
enforcement. Assuming the rules of reconciliation or PAYGO are in general
effect, it is reasonable for a judge to assume that the CBO score influences
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Congress. Notably, the rules need not be perfectly followed for that to be the
case, which is why reliance on CBO assumptions is descriptively accurate.
There are, of course, contexts in which the CBO score cannot help the
interpreter. Most notably, the interpreter may not have access to the
underlying assumptions made by the estimators. Additionally, if an act was
outside reconciliation and Congress has waived PAYGO, the CBO or JCT
scores have much less impact. In these contexts, then, it would be unwise to
rely heavily upon the scores in the interpretation of the statute.
To summarize, courts should not ignore the context in which legislation
is enacted. A court’s knowledge of the general rules of reconciliation limiting
debate allows it to understand how the process leads to poor drafting.
Recreating how the more granular rules of reconciliation, such as the Byrd
Rule, functioned in that process is much more problematic.
B.

Appropriations
Subpart II(A) examined whether congressional rules on appropriations
could be used to guide interpretation and found Congress often disregards
them. How might a contextualized process-based interpretative approach
look? We can turn once again to TVA v. Hill, the snail darter case. As
mentioned above, the Court invoked the legislative rules in the area that
foreclosed legislating on appropriations, ruling that the appropriations for the
dam could not be spent since the dam would have conflicted with the
Endangered Species Act.320
Congressional rules, however, can say one thing while Congress does
another. Underlying the Court’s approach is a deeper misunderstanding of
the legislative process. The Court, in enforcing a rule against implied repeals,
rejected expressions by the appropriations committees that the dam would
take precedence over the prior act.321 In so doing, the Court reasoned that
appropriations were somehow lesser than “statutes enacted by Congress” in
the deliberative process.322 In the Court’s view, the appropriations process
was an insignificant part of the legislative process, with Congress as a whole
ignoring the appropriations committees.323
Interestingly, the Court misses the fact that Congress heavily focuses
upon the appropriations process. It is, after all, where the money is. As a
result, there are a vast number of interests that signal their demands to
legislators, and the appropriations-committee members are among the most

320. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text..
321. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191–92 (1978).
322. Id. at 191; Matthew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and
Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon of Statutory Interpretation,
14 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 669, 683–84 (2005).
323. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 322, at 684.
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powerful. The engaged and interested stakeholders ensure that Congress
actively participates in the appropriations process.324 A contextualized,
process-based approach to interpretation would take this into consideration
in interpreting appropriations statutes. Far from hiding in obscurity, the
appropriations bill at issue in TVA v. Hill, and the accompanying committee
reports, was likely subject to much scrutiny in Congress. The Court, in
adopting a stricter stance against repeals by implication in the context of
appropriations, goes against the bigger realities of the legislative process,
obscuring the forest for the trees.
Building upon this contextualized view further, the TVA v. Hill Court
rejected the legislative history preserving the dam project because it was in
the legislative history rather than the text. This overlooked the congressional
reality that appropriations bills generally contain directives in the legislative
history since the financial blueprint resides in the text.325 In fact, the
legislative rules prohibiting regulatory language in the appropriations text
make legislative history exceptionally important in the appropriations
context. In this context, then, a court’s knowledge of the rules can assist it in
giving proper weight to legislative history.326 Regardless of whether
Congress follows the rules forbidding legislating on appropriations with
precision (and they do not, as we now know), these rules serve generally to
elevate the importance of legislative history in the appropriations context.
C.

Subject Specific Interpretation

Another implication of developing a highly contextualized approach to
process-based interpretation is recognition of the advantages that an “intrasubstantive” approach entails.327 Courts themselves have begun to develop
interpretive principles that reflect the particular committees and processes of
the subject matter at issue. James Brudney and Corey Ditslear have, for
instance, compared the interpretive approaches of tax statutes and workplace

324. Id. at 696–97.
325. See Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 761 (characterizing legislative history as a
“necessary repository of Congress’s directives with respect to how the money should be spent”).
326. See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 115-177, r. XXI(2)(a)(1), (c) at 871–72 (2019) (discussing
unauthorized appropriations reported in general appropriation bills); STANDING RULES OF THE
SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XVI(2), at 11 (2013) (prohibiting amendments to appropriations
bills from proposing “new or general legislation” or restricting expenditures based on limitations
“not authorized by law”).
327. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 800; see Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and
Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1033–58 (1998) (highlighting cases in
which “background principles” were a “vital consideration” in the interpretation of administrative
law statutes).
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statutes, concluding that the Supreme Court often tailors their interpretation
based on the realities of the committees and process at issue.328
For instance, many members of the Court make heavy reliance upon
legislative history in the tax context.329 This reflects the fact that committee
reports in the tax context have been essential in elaborating complex, arcane,
and highly technical tax statutes. The JCT is traditionally heavily involved in
the process of drafting the committee reports, as are members of the Treasury
Department and the tax committees. In the Senate, committee votes on tax
policies occur on conceptual markups, rather than actual statutory text,
making the legislative history even more important. For all of these reasons,
members tend to rely heavily on committee reports on tax legislation.330
A contextualized, process-based view would commend the Court’s
attunement to the procedural differences across subject matter. That being
said, some procedures reduce the differences between subject matters. For
example, when tax legislation is passed through reconciliation, as was done
with the TCJA, the legislative history becomes of reduced importance. In the
TCJA context, contrary to past practice in major tax acts, the committee
reports did not generally detail the policy reasons behind legislative changes.
This reflects the rushed process in which it was passed. A court should adjust
its interpretative stance accordingly, perhaps decreasing reliance on
legislative history in the tax-reconciliation context or not reading too much
into its absence.
D.

Summary
To summarize, knowledge of congressional procedure can guide the
judiciary to a more nuanced understanding of Congress and the meaning of
its statutes. This is a different project than strict interpretation of a statute in
accordance with legislative rules, which has the danger of leading the
interpreter astray from congressional reality. Nonetheless, familiarity with
the rules can deepen awareness of congressional procedure, allowing the
interpreter to take it seriously.
Conclusion
The process-based school of interpretation is poised to reinvigorate the
field of statutory interpretation through the formulation of predictable rules
with democratic bona fides. New interpretive presumptions, however, must
strive to reflect congressional process without essentializing it. Congress’s
procedural frameworks are a tempting shorthand, but they are only a
guideline.
328. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 315.
329. Id. at 1283.
330. Id. at 1281–82.
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This Article began with a riddle: What is the significance of the rules to
an interpreter when Congress routinely flouts them? Attempts to improve the
process by indirectly enforcing the rules through statutory interpretation risks
subverting Congress’s lawmaking. Such coercion also risks advancing rules
in a manner that is corruptive to the legislative process rather than
ameliorative. This is because such an approach necessarily ignores the
inherent safety valves of the rules. The rules in the abstract do not guarantee
a rational lawmaking process; instead, it is their application that allows
Congress to weigh competing considerations that are essential to the
legislative endeavor.
Should, then, we abandon the procedural framework in interpretation? I
have begun to explore the ways in which the rules can deepen our
understanding of Congress, even when they are not being followed. At times,
this leads the interpreter to glean only high-level glimpses into Congress’s
inner workings. Other times, the interpreter may achieve a more granular
reconstruction of the process through the rules.
To be sure, rooting interpretation in congressional procedure presents
formidable difficulties. In just a few years, however, undaunted scholars and
judges have made important inroads to the project through careful study of
Congress. Building a robust picture of the legislative arena is a collective
enterprise that will continue to take the time and effort of many contributors.
Perhaps most challenging, it will require the recognition of modest insights
into the legislative process rather than simply extraordinary ones.

